Early's Brigade at Manassas by Jubal Early - History

Early's Brigade at Manassas by Jubal Early - History

At this time the largest organizations in our army were brigades, and each brigade commander received his orders directly from headquarters. Since the conference at Fairfax Station, when General Beauregard stated that his effective strength did not exceed 15,000 men, one regiment, the 1st South Carolina, had been sent off by reason of expiration of term of service, and one regiment, the 7th Louisiana, had joined my brigade. Besides this, General Beauregard 's troops had been augmented, since the advance of the enemy, by the arrival of six companies of the 8th Louisiana, the 5th North Carolina State Troops, the 11th North Carolina Volunteers, the 13th Mississippi, three companies of the 49th Virginia and Hampton's South Carolina Legion; the latter containing six companies of infantry. His whole effective force, however, did not probably much exceed the estimate made at the time of the conference, as the measles and typhoid fever, which were prevailing, had reduced very much the strength of the regiments, especially among the Virginia troops which were entirely new. To reinforce him, Holmes' brigade of two regiments had arrived from Aquia Creek, and Johnston's troops were arriving by the railroad, after much delay by reason of accidents or mismanagement on the part of the railroad officials.

On the 20th we were not molested by the enemy, and on the morning of the 21st the position of Beauregard's troops was pretty much the same as it had been on the 18th, to wit: Ewell at Union Mills; I). R. Jones at McLean's Ford; Longstreet, reinforced by the 5th North Carolina, at Blackburn's Ford; Bonham, reinforced by six companies of the 8th Louisiana and the 11th North Carolina Volunteers, at Mitchell's Ford; Cocke, reinforced by some companies of the 8th Virginia Regiment and three companies of the 49th Virginia Regiment, at some fords below Stone Bridge; and Evans at Stone Bridge; while my brigade was in reserve in the woods in rear of McLean's farm. No artillery was attached to my brigade on this day.

The arrival of General Johnston in person and the transportation of his troops on the railroad had, of course, entirely changed the plans of operations as communicated to us on the night of the 19th, but the new plans, which were rendered necessary by the altered condition of things, were not communicated to us, and I had, therefore, to await orders.

Very early on the morning of the 21st the enemy opened fire with artillery from the heights on the north of Bull Run near Blackburn's Ford, and I was ordered to occupy a position in rear of the pine woods north of McLean's house, so as to be ready to support Long street or Jones as might be necessary. After being in position some time, I received a request from General Longstreet for one of my regiments to be sent to him, and I sent him the six companies of the 24th Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel Hairston, and two companies of the 7th Louisiana under Major Penn. Not long afterwards I received a request for another regiment, and I carried the remaining eight companies of the 7th Louisiana to Blackburn's Ford, leaving Colonel Kemper with his regiment behind.

On arriving at the ford, I found that the whole of Longstreet's brigade had been crossed over Bull Run, and were lying under cover at the foot of the hills on its northern bank, awaiting a signal to advance against the enemy, who was in considerable force near the point occupied by his artillery at the fight on the 18th. The companies of the 24th were being crossed over to join Longstreet 's brigade, and the General ordered the 7th Louisiana to be formed in line in the strip of woods on the southern bank of be stream, covering the ford.

The enemy was keeping up a continuous artillery fire from two batteries, one in front of the ford and the other some distance to the right, which rendered the vicinity of the ford quite uncomfortable, but the troops across the Run were in a great measure under cover.

After Hays' regiment had been put in position, General Longstreet went across the stream to reconnoiter, and in a short time returned and directed me to take Hays' and Kemper 's regiments, cross at McLean's Ford, and move around and capture the battery to his right, which he said could be easily taken. I was informed by him that Jones had crossed the Run and was on the hills beyond McLean's Ford, likewise awaiting the signal to advance, and I was directed to move between him and the Run against the enemy's battery. Hays' regiment was moved back to where Kemper 's was, and was exposed to the fire from the enemy's batteries which was attracted by the dust arising from its march over the direct road through the pines. A shell exploded in the ranks, killing and wounding four or five men. The two regiments were moved to McLean's Ford, and while they were crossing over and forming, I rode forward to an eminence, where I observed a lookout in a tree, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact position of the battery and the route over which I would have to advance against it. While I was engaged in obtaining this information, Colonel Chisolin, a volunteer aide of General Beauregard, rode up and informed me that General Beauregard's orders were that the whole force should cross Bull Run to the south side.

I think this was about 11.00 A. M. I informed him of the order I had received from General Longstreet, and he stated that Longstreet was crossing, and that the order embraced me as well as the rest. I felt this as a reprieve from almost certain destruction, for I had discovered that the route by which I would be compelled to advance against the battery was along an open valley for some distance and then up a naked bill to the plain on which the battery was located, the greater part of the route being raked by the enemy's guns. The lookout had also informed me that a considerable body of infantry was in the woods near the battery. It turned out afterwards that this battery, which I was ordered to take, was supported by a brigade of infantry, posted behind a formidable abattis of felled timber. An attempt to carry out my orders would very probably have entailed the annihilation or utter rout of my two regiments; and in fact much later in the day, Jones' brigade on moving against this battery sustained a damaging repulse.

After recrossing to the south side, I sent Kemper's regiment to its former position, and moved with Hays' regiment up the Run to Longstreet's position, as I thought he probably desired its return to him. On reaching Blackburn's Ford, I found General Longstreet cautiously withdrawing a part of his troops across the Run, and he informed me that he did not now require Hays' regiment, but would retain the companies of the 24th. Hays was then ordered to move down the Run to McLean's Ford and return in that way to the position at which Kemper was, so as to avoid the artillery fire while passing over the direct route.

I rode directly to Kemper's position, and after being there a short time I discovered clouds of dust arising about McLean's Ford, which I supposed to be produced by Jones' brigade returning to its original position. Fearing that Hays' regiment might be mistaken for the enemy and fired upon, I rode rapidly to Jones' position and found some of his men forming in the rifle pits in rear of the ford, while the General was looking with his field glasses at Hays' regiment, which was advancing from the direction of the enemy's position higher up the Run. I informed him what command it was and requested that his men might be cautioned against firing, for which they were preparing.

As soon as this was done, General Jones asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard, directing that I should go to him with my brigade. Upon my stating that I had received no such order, he said that he had received a note from General Beauregard in which he was directed to send me to the General. The note, which was in the hands of one of Jones' staff officers, was sent for and shown to me. It was in pencil, and after giving brief directions for the withdrawal across the Run and stating the general purpose to go to the left where the heavy firing was, there was a direction at the foot in very nearly these words, -' 'Send Early to me." This information was given to me some tine between 12 M. and 1 P. M.*

The note did not state to what point I was to go, but I knew that General Beauregard's position had been near Mitchell's Ford and that he was to be found somewhere to our left. I sent word for Hay's to move up as rapidly as possible, directed Kemper to get ready to move, sent a message to General Longstreet requesting the return of the companies of the 24th, and directed my Acting Adjutant General, Captain Gardner, to ride to Mitchell's Ford and ascertain where General Beauregard was, as well as the route I was to pursue.

The messenger sent to General Longstreet returned and informed me that the General said there was a regiment in the pines to my left which had been ordered to report to him, and that I could take that regiment instead of the companies of my own, to save time and prevent the exposure of both to the fire of the enemy's artillery in passing to and from Blackburn's Ford. In this arrangement I readily concurred, and soon found, to my left in the pines, the 13th Mississippi Regiment under Colonel Barksdale, which had very recently arrived. The Colonel consented to accompany me, and as soon as the command could be got ready, it was started on the road towards Mitchell's Ford.

This movement commenced about or very shortly after 1 o'clock P. On the way I met Captain Gardner returning with the information that General Beauregard's headquarters would be at the Lewis house, in the direction of the firing on our extreme left, and that I was to go there. On reaching General Bonham's position in rear of Mitdell's Ford, he informed me that I would have to move through the fields towards the left to find the Lewis house, and he pointed out the direction; but he did not know the exact location of the house. I moved in the direction pointed out, and continued to pass on to our left, through the fields, towards the firing in the distance, endeavoring, as I advanced, to find out where the Lewis house was.

While moving on, Captain Smith, an assistant in the adjutant general's office at General Beauregard's headquarters, passed us in a great hurry, also looking for General Beauregard and the Lewis house. He told me that information had been received at the Junction that 6,000 of the enemy had passed the Manassas Gap railroad, and it was this information (which subsequently proved to be false) that he was going to communicate to the General.

The day was excessively hot and dry. Hays' regiment was a good deal exhausted by the marching and the counter-marching about Blackburn's and McLean's Fords. Barksdale 's regiment, an entirely new one, had just arrived from the south over the railroad, and was unused to marching. Our progress was therefore not as rapid as I could have wished, but we passed on with all possible speed in the direction of the firing, which was our only guide. Towards 3 o'clock P. we reached the field of battle and began to perceive the scenes usual in rear of an army engaged in action. On entering the road leading from the Lewis house towards Manassas, we met quite a stream of stragglers going to the rear, and were informed by them that everything was over with us. I was riding by the side of Colonel Kemper at the head of the column, and we had the satisfaction of being assured that if we went on the field on horseback, we certainly would be killed, as the enemy shot all the mounted officers. Some of the men said that their regiments had been entirely cut to pieces, and there was no use for them to remain any longer.

It was to the encouraging remarks of this stream of recreants that my command was exposed as it moved on, but not a man fell out of ranks. Only one man who had been engaged offered to return and he belonged to the 4th Alabama Regiment, which he said had been nearly destroyed, but he declared that he would "go back and give them another trial." He fell into the ranks of Kemper 's regiment and I believe remained with it to the close of the battle. Captain Gardner had been sent ahead for instructions and had met with Colonel John S. Preston, a volunteer aide to General Beauregard; and on our getting near to the battlefield, Colonel Preston rode to meet us and informed me that the General had gone to the front on the right, to conduct an attack on the enemy, but that General Johnston was on that part of the field near which we were and would give me instructions. He pointed out the direction in which General Johnston was, and I moved on, soon meeting the General himself, who rode towards us when he discovered our approach, and expressed his gratification at our arrival.

I asked him at once to show me my position, to which he replied that he was too much engaged to do that in person, but would give me directions as to what I was to do. He then directed me to move to our own extreme left and attack the enemy on his right, stating that by directing my march along the rear of our line, by the sound of the firing in front, there could be no mistake; and he cautioned me to take especial care to clear our whole line before advancing to the front, and be particular and not fire on any of our own troops, which he was sorry to say had been done in some instances.

Affairs now wore a very gloomy aspect, and from all the indications in the rear the day appeared to be going against us. While General Johnston was speaking to me, quite a squad of men approached us going to the rear, and the General asking them to what regiment they belonged and where going without receiving any satisfactory answer, directed me to make my men charge bayonets and drive them back to the front. I immediately ordered Colonel Kemper to charge them with his regiment, when they commenced making excuses, saying they were sick, or wounded, or had no ammunition. I saw at once there was no fight in them, and I directed Colonel Kemper to move on and not delay battling with such cowards.

Immediately in front of us was a body of woods extending to our left, in which there was a constant rattle of musketry, and I moved along the rear of this woods, crossing the road from Manassas to Sudley, and inclining to the left so as to clear our line entirely. While so moving Colonel Kemper pointed out to me the United States flag floating in the distance on some high point in front of our right, probably the top of a house.

To clear our line entirely on our left, I found that it was necessary to pass beyond the woods in which our troops were, and as I approached the open space beyond, a messenger came to me from Colonel, afterwards General, J. E. B. Stuart, who was on our extreme left with two companies of cavalry and a battery of artillery under Lieutenant Beckham, stating that the Colonel said the enemy was about giving way and if we would hurry up he would soon be in retreat. This was the first word of encouragement I had received after reaching the vicinity of the battlefield. I was then making all the haste the condition of my men, who were much blown, would permit, and I directed my march to a field immediately on the left of the woods, and between Stuart's position and the left of our infantry then engaged.

The messenger from Colonel Stuart soon returned in a gallop and stated that the Colonel said the enemy had only retired his right behind a ridge now in my front, and was moving another flanking column behind said ridge still further to our left, and he cautioned me to be on the lookout for this new column.

Having now cleared the woods, I moved to the front,. in order to form line against the flanking column the enemy was reported forming behind the ridge in front of me. I ordered Colonel Kemper, who was in front, to form his regiment, by file, into line in the open field, just on the left of the woods, and sent back directions for the other regiments to move up as rapidly as possible and form to Kemper's left in echelon. Just at this time I observed a body of our troops move from a piece of woods on my immediate right across an open space to another in front of it, and this proved to be the left regiment of Elzey's brigade. I heard a rapid fire open from the woods into which this regiment had moved, and a body of the enemy approached on the crest of the ridge immediately in my front, preceded by a line of skirmishers.

This ridge was the one on which is situated Chinn's house, so often mentioned in the description of this battle, and the subsequent one near the same position. It is a high ridge sloping off towards our right, and the enemy had the decided advantage of the ground, as my troops had to form on the low ground on our side of the ridge, near a small stream which runs along its base. The formation of my troops was in full view of the enemy, and his skirmishers, which were about four hundred yards in front of us, opened on my men, while forming, with long range rifles or minie muskets. Barksdale and Hays came up rapidly and formed as directed, Barksdale in the centre and Hays on the left.

While their regiments were forming by file into line, under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, Kemper's regiment commenced moving obliquely to the right towards the woods into which Elzey's troops had been seen to move, and I rode in front and halted it, informing it that there were no troops in the woods, and pointing out the enemy on the crest of the ridge in front. I then rode to the other regiments to direct their movements, when Colonel Kemper, finding the fire of the enemy, who was beyond the range of our smooth bores, very annoying to his men, moved rapidly to the front, to the cover of a fence at the foot of the ridge. As soon as Hays' regiment was formed, I ordered an advance and Hays moved forward until in a line with Kemper, then their two regiments started up the side of the hill. As we advanced the enemy disappeared behind the crest, and while we were ascending the slope Lieutenant McDonald, acting aide to Colonel Elzey, came riding rapidly towards me and requested me not to let n men fire on the troops in my front, stating that they consisted of the 13th Virginia regiment of Tlzev's brigade. I said to him, -'' They have been firing on my men,'' to which he replied, ''I know they have, but it is a mistake, I recognize colonel Hill of the 11th, and his horse.'' This was a mistake on the part of Lieutenant McDonald, arising from a fancied resemblance of a mounted officer with the enemy to the Colonel of the 13th. This regiment did not reach the battlefield at all.

This information and the positive assurance of Lieutenant McDonald, however, caused me to halt my troops and ride to the crest of the ride where I observed a regiment about two hundred yards to my right drawn up in line in front of the woods where Elzey's left was. The dress of the volunteers on both sides at that time was very similar, and the flag of the regiment I saw was drooping around the staff, so that I could not see whether it was the United States or the Confederate flag. The very confident manner of Lieutenant McDonald, in his statement in regard to the troops in my front, induced me to believe that this must also be one of our regiments.

Colonel Stuart had also advanced on my left with his two companies of cavalry and Beckham's battery of four guns, and passed around Chinn 's house, the battery had been brought into action and opened a flank fire on the regiment I was observing. Thinking it certainly was one of ours, I started a messenger to Colonel Stuart, to give him the information and request him to stop the firing, but a second shell or ball from Beckham's guns caused the regiment to face about and retire rapidly, when I saw the United States flag unfurled and discovered the mistake into which I had been led by Lieutenant McDonald.

I immediately ordered my command forward and it advanced to the crest of the hill. All this occurred in less time than it has taken me to describe it. On reaching the crest we came in view of the Warrenton Pike and the plains beyond, and now saw the enemy's troops in full retreat across and beyond the pike. When Kemper's and Hays' regiments had advanced, Barks-dale's, under a misapprehension of my orders, had not at first moved, but it soon followed, and the whole command was formed in line, along the crest of the ridge, on the right of Chin's house.

We were now on the extreme left of the whole of our infantry, and in advance of the main line. The only troops on our left of any description were the two companies of cavalry and Beckham's battery with Stuart. On my immediate right and a little to the rear was Elzey's brigade, and farther to the right I saw our line extending towards Bull Run, but I discovered no indications of a forward movement.

My troops were now very much exhausted, especially Hays' regiment, which had been marching nearly all the morning before our movement to the left, and it was necessary to give the men a little time to breathe. Beckham's guns had continued firing on the retreating enemy until beyond their range, and Stuart soon went in pursuit followed by Beckham. Colonel Cocke now came up and joined me with the 19th Virginia Regiment.

As soon as my men had rested a little, I directed the brigade to advance in column of divisions along the route over which we had seen the enemy retiring, and I sent information to the troops, on my right, of my purpose to move in their front with the request not to fire on us. I moved forward followed by Cocke's regiment, crossing Young's branch and the Warrenton Pike to the north side. When we got into the valley of Young's branch we lost sight of the enemy, and on ascending to the plains north of the pike we could see nothing of them. Passing to the west and north of the houses known as the Dogan house, the Stone Tavern, the Matthews house and the Carter or Pittsylvania house, and being guided by the abandoned haversacks and muskets, we moved over the ground on which the battle had begun with Evans in the early morning, and continued our march until we had cleared our right.

We had now got to a point where Bull Run makes a considerable bend above Stone Bridge, and I halted as we had not observed any movement from the main line. Nothing could be seen of the enemy, and his troops had scattered so much in the retreat that it was impossible for me to tell what route he had taken. Moreover the country was entirely unknown to me. Stuart and Beckham had crossed the run above me, and Cocke's regiment had also moved towards a ford above where I was. While I was engaged in making some observations and trying to find out what was going on, Colonel Chisolm of General Beauregard's volunteer staff passed me with a detachment of cavalry in pursuit of a body of the enemy supposed to be across Bull Run above me.

About this time it was reported to me that the enemy had sent us a flag of truce, but on inquiry I found it was a messenger with a note from Colonel Jones of the 4th Alabama Regiment, who had been very badly wounded and was at one of the enemy's hospitals in rear of the battlefield, and I sent for him and had him brought in to Matthews' house near where the battle had begun. I also found Lieutenant Colonel Gardner of the 8th Georgia Regiment in the yard of the Carter house, where he had been brought by some of the enemy engaged in collecting the wounded, and suffering from a very painful wound.

Shortly after this President Davis, accompanied by several gentlemen, rode to where my command was. He addressed a few remarks to each regiment and was received with great enthusiasm. I then informed him of the condition of things as far as I knew them, told him of the condition and location of Colonel Gardner, and requested him to have medical assistance sent to him, as no medical officer could be found with my command at that time. I informed him of the fact that I was unacquainted with the situation of the country and without orders to guide me under the circumstances, and asked him what I should do.

He said I had better form my men in line near where I was and let them rest until orders were received. I requested him to inform Generals Beauregard and Johnston of my position and ask them to send me orders. While we were conversing we observed a body of troops across Bull Run, some distance below, moving in good order in the direction of Centreville. I at first supposed it to be Bonham's brigade moving from Mitchell's Ford, but it turned out to be Kershaw's and Cash's remnants of that brigade, which had preceded me to the battlefield and were now moving in pursuit, after having crossed at or below Stone Bridge. Bonham's position at Mitchell's Ford was entirely too far off for his movement to be observed.

As soon as Mr. Davis left me, I moved my command farther into the bend of Bull Run, and put it in line across the bend with the flanks resting on the stream, the right flank being some distance above Stone Bridge. In this position my troops spent the night. They were considerably exhausted by the fatigues of the day, and had had nothing to eat since the early morning. They were now miles away from their baggage and trains. Early in the morning a Virginia company under Captain Gibson, unattached, had been permitted, at the request of the Captain, to join Kemper's regiment and remained with it throughout the day. A South Carolina company belonging to Kershaw's or Cash's regiment, which was on picket at the time their regiments moved from Mitchell's Ford, not being able to find its proper command, had joined me just as we were advancing against the enemy near Chin 's house, and had been attached to Hays' regiment, with which it went into action. Lieutenant Murat Willis had volunteered his services early in the day as aide and been with me through all my movements, rendering valuable service.

The conduct of my troops during the whole day had been admirable, and the coolness with which they formed in open ground under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was deserving of all praise. They were in a condition to have taken up the pursuit the next day, but it would have been with empty haversacks, or rather without any except those picked up on the battlefield and along the line of the enemy's retreat.

My loss was in killed and wounded, seventy-six, the greater part being in Kemper 's regiment.

The troops which were immediately in my front near Chinn's house constituted the enemy's extreme right, and were, I think, composed in part of the regulars attached to McDowell's army. Their long range muskets or rifles enabled them to inflict the loss on my command, but I am satisfied that the latter inflicted little or no loss on the enemy, as he retired before we got within range with our arms, which were smooth-bore muskets.

As soon as my troops were disposed for the night and steps taken to guard the front, I rode with my staff officers in search of either General Beauregard or General Johnston, in order to give information on my position and get instructions for the next morning Not knowing the roads, I had to take the circuitous route over which I had advanced, but I finally reached the Lewis house to find it a hospital for the wounded, and the headquarters removed. Not being able to get here any information of either of the generals, I rode in the direction of Manassas until I met an officer who said he was on the staff of General Johnston and was looking for him. He stated that he was just from Manassas and did not think either of the generals was there.

Taking this to be true and not knowing where to look further, I rode back along the Sudley Mills road to the Stone Tavern, passing over the main battlefield, and rejoined my command after twelve o'clock at night, when I lay down to rest, my bed being a bundle of wheat. While trying to find the generals, I discovered that there was very great confusion among our troops that had been engaged in the battle. They were scattered in every direction, regiments being separated from their brigades, companies from their regiments, while many squads and individuals were seeking their commands. That part of the army was certainly in no condition to make pursuit next morning.

Very early on the morning of the 22nd, I sent Captain Fleming Gardner to Manassas for instruction, and he returned with directions to me from General Beauregard to remain where I was until further orders, and to have my men made as comfortable as possible. A heavy rain had now set in, which continued through the day and night. When it was ascertained that there was to be no movement, I rode over the battlefield and to the hospitals in the vicinity to see about having my wounded brought in who had not been taken care of. The country in rear of the enemy's line of battle of the day before, and along his routes of retreat was strewn with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, blankets, overcoats, india-rubber cloths, muskets, equipments, and all the debris of a routed army.

A report subsequently made by a Committee of the Federal Congress, of which Senator Wade was chairman, gave a most preposterous account of "Rebel atrocities" committed upon the dead and wounded of the Federal army after the battle. I am able to say, from my personal knowledge, that its statements are false, and the Federal surgeons, left with the wounded, could bear testimony to their falsehood.

Battle of Chancellorsville

The Battle of Chancellorsville was a major battle of the American Civil War (1861–1865), and the principal engagement of the Chancellorsville campaign. [13] It was fought from April 30 to May 6, 1863, in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, near the village of Chancellorsville. Two related battles were fought nearby on May 3 in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. The campaign pitted Union Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac against an army less than half its size, General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia.

Chancellorsville campaign:

    133,868 ("present for duty equipped"): [7][8]

    Chancellorsville campaign:

    Chancellorsville is known as Lee's "perfect battle" because his risky decision to divide his army in the presence of a much larger enemy force resulted in a significant Confederate victory. The victory, a product of Lee's audacity and Hooker's timid decision-making, was tempered by heavy casualties, including Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson. Jackson was hit by friendly fire, requiring his left arm to be amputated. He died of pneumonia eight days later, a loss that Lee likened to losing his right arm.

    The two armies faced off against each other at Fredericksburg during the winter of 1862–1863. The Chancellorsville campaign began when Hooker secretly moved the bulk of his army up the left bank of the Rappahannock River, then crossed it on the morning of April 27, 1863. Union cavalry under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman began a long-distance raid against Lee's supply lines at about the same time. This operation was completely ineffectual. Crossing the Rapidan River via Germanna and Ely's Fords, the Federal infantry concentrated near Chancellorsville on April 30. Combined with the Union force facing Fredericksburg, Hooker planned a double envelopment, attacking Lee from both his front and rear.

    On May 1, Hooker advanced from Chancellorsville toward Lee, but the Confederate general split his army in the face of superior numbers, leaving a small force at Fredericksburg to deter Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick from advancing, while he attacked Hooker's advance with about four-fifths of his army. Despite the objections of his subordinates, Hooker withdrew his men to the defensive lines around Chancellorsville, ceding the initiative to Lee. On May 2, Lee divided his army again, sending Stonewall Jackson's entire corps on a flanking march that routed the Union XI Corps. While performing a personal reconnaissance in advance of his line, Jackson was wounded by fire after dark from his own men close between the lines, and cavalry commander Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart temporarily replaced him as corps commander.

    The fiercest fighting of the battle—and the second bloodiest day of the Civil War—occurred on May 3 as Lee launched multiple attacks against the Union position at Chancellorsville, resulting in heavy losses on both sides and the pulling back of Hooker's main army. That same day, Sedgwick advanced across the Rappahannock River, defeated the small Confederate force at Marye's Heights in the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, and then moved to the west. The Confederates fought a successful delaying action at the Battle of Salem Church. On the 4th Lee turned his back on Hooker and attacked Sedgwick, and drove him back to Banks' Ford, surrounding them on three sides. Sedgwick withdrew across the ford early on May 5. Lee turned back to confront Hooker who withdrew the remainder of his army across U.S. Ford the night of May 5–6.

    The campaign ended on May 7 when Stoneman's cavalry reached Union lines east of Richmond. Both armies resumed their previous position across the Rappahannock from each other at Fredericksburg. With the loss of Jackson, Lee reorganized his army, and flush with victory began what was to become the Gettysburg campaign a month later.

    Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, Farragut’s Run Past – April 24, 1862 Part II

    The Cayuga was the first ship through the water barrier at about 3:30 a. m. The Confederates did not discover the Cayuga until about 10 minutes later, when it was well under Fort Jackson. Understandably, General Duncan at Fort Jackson subsequently complained that Mitchell had failed to send any fire rafts to light the river at night, nor had he stationed any vessel below the forts to warn of the Union approach. The different naval commands and lack of cooperation between land and naval commanders indeed proved costly for the defenders.

    As soon as they spotted the Cayuga, gunners at both Confederate forts opened up almost simultaneously, with the Union ships in position to do so immediately replying. Soon the river surface was filled with clouds of thick smoke from the discharges of the guns. This smoke obscured vision from both the ships and the shore, but on balance it favored the ships. Porter, meanwhile, had brought forward the five steamers assigned to his mortar schooners and these opened up an enfilading fire at some 200 yards from Fort Jackson, pouring into it grape, canister, and shrapnel shell, while the mortars added their shells. This fire did drive many of the Confederate gun crews from their guns and reduced the effectiveness of those who remained.

    The Pensacola, the second Union ship through the obstacles, was slow to get under way, and this meant that for some time the Cayuga faced the full fury of the Confederate fire alone. Lieutenant George H. Perkins, piloting the Cayuga, had the presence of mind to note that the Confederate guns had been laid so as to concentrate fire on the middle of the river and therefore took his ship closer to the walls of Fort St. Philip. Although its masts and rigging were shot up, the hull largely escaped damage.

    The captain of the Pensacola, Captain Henry W. Morris, apparently interpreted Farragut’s orders to mean that he was to engage the forts. Halting his ship in the middle of the obstructions, he let loose a broadside against Fort St. Philip, driving the gun crews onshore to safety. On clearing the obstructions, he ordered a second broadside against the fort. But stopping the Pensacola dead in the water made it an ideal target. It took nine shots in the hull, and its rigging and masts were also much cut up. The Pensacola also suffered 4 killed and 33 wounded, more than any other Union ship in the operation that day.

    The leading division continued upriver, engaging targets as they presented themselves. The remaining Union ships followed, firing grape and canister as well as round shot. The shore batteries had difficulty finding the range, and damage and casualties aboard these vessels were slight.

    About 4:00 a. m., the Confederate Navy warships above the forts joined the battle. The most powerful of these, the McRae, lay anchored along the shore 300 yards above Fort St. Philip when its lookouts spotted the Cayuga. Lieutenant Thomas B. Huger, captain of the McRae, ordered cables slipped and fire opened. The McRae opened up with its port battery and pivot gun, but the latter burst on its 10th round. The Cayuga continued upriver, passing the McRae. Two other Union ships, the Varuna and Oneida, then exited the smoke and steamed past the McRae without firing on it, probably taking it for a Union gunboat. Huger ordered his vessel to sheer first to port and then to starboard, delivering two broadsides. The Varuna and Oneida also sheered and returned fire. Each of these ships mounted two XI-inch Dahlgrens in pivot and these guns soon told. The explosion of one Union shell started a fire in the McRae, and only desperate efforts by the crew kept the blaze from reaching the magazine.

    Although most of the remaining lightly armed Confederate warships fled upriver on the approach of the Union ships, this was not the case with the ram Manassas. Although his ship was armed with only a single 32-pounder, Lieutenant Alexan der Warley was determined to attack, even alone. Warley understood that the only chance for a Confederate victory lay in an immediate combined assault by the gunboats and fire rafts to immobilize the Union vessels long enough for the heavy guns in the forts to destroy them.

    The Manassas lay moored to the east bank of the river above Fort St. Philip, when flashes in the vicinity of the obstacles indicated action in progress. Warley immediately ordered his ship to get under way. He attempted to ram the Pensacola, but skillful maneuvering by the Union pilot avoided a collision, and the Pensacola let loose with a broadside from its IX-inch Dahlgren guns as the Manassas passed. Damaged in the exchange, the Confederate ram nonetheless continued on.

    Warley then spotted the side-wheeler Mississippi. Lieutenant George Dewey tried to turn his ship so as to ram the onrushing Manassas, but the latter proved more agile than the Union paddle wheeler and was able to strike the Mississippi a glancing blow on its port side, opening a large hole there but failing to fatally damage the Mississippi.

    As the Union ships cleared the forts, they came under fire from the Confederate ironclad Louisiana along the riverbank. Its gun ports were small and did not allow a wide arc of fire, so the gun crews scored few hits.

    Proceeding north, the leading Cayuga overtook some of the fleeing Confederate vessels and fired into them. Three of the Confederate gunboats struck their colors and ran ashore. The Varuna and Oneida soon came up, but in the confusion sailors in the Varuna mistook the Cayuga for a Confederate vessel and fired a broadside into it.

    Impatient with the Pensacola’s slow progress, meanwhile, Farragut ordered the Hartford to pass it and then climbed into the mizzen rigging so as to secure a better view over the smoke. As the Hartford proceeded upriver, Farragut saw a fire raft blazing off the port bow, pushed forward by the unarmed Confederate tug Moser. Farragut ordered his own ship to turn to starboard, but it was too close to the shore and its bow immediately grounded hard in a mud bank, allowing Captain Horace Sherman of the Moser to position the raft against the Hartford’s port side. The blaze soon ignited the paint on the side of the Union vessel, which then caught the rigging. With his ship on fire and immobilized, Farragut thought it was doomed. Fortunately, the gunners at Fort St. Philip were unable to fire into the now stationary target as the fleet’s fire had dismounted one of the fort’s largest guns and another could not be brought to bear.

    Farragut came down out of the rigging to the deck where he exhorted the Hart ford’s crew to fight the fire. Gunfire from the flagship, meanwhile, sank the Moser. Farragut’s clerk, Bradley Osbon, brought up three shells, unscrewed their fuses, and dropped them over the gunwale of the Hartford into the fire raft. The resulting explosions tore holes in the raft and sank it, extinguishing the flames. With the raft gone, the Hartford’s crew was able to extinguish the fires. The men cheered as their ship backed free of the mud bank and resumed course upriver.

    In the confusion and smoke, accidents occurred. The gunboat Kineo collided with the sloop Brooklyn although seriously damaged, the Kineo was able to continue on past the forts. The Brooklyn, meanwhile, plowed into one of the Confederate hulks, then suddenly ground to a halt just north of the obstructions, its anchor caught in the hulk and hawser taut. The river current then turned the sloop broadside to Fort St. Philip. With the gunners ashore having found the range and the Brooklyn taking hits, a crewman managed to cut the cable and free the sloop.

    Captain Thomas T. Craven of the Brooklyn ordered it to pass close to Fort St. Philip, the sloop firing three broadsides into the Confederate works as it steamed past. The Brooklyn then passed the Louisiana at very close quarters. In the exchange of fire, a Confederate shell struck the Union ship just above the waterline but failed to explode. Later, the Brooklyn’s crew discovered that the Confederate gunners had failed to remove the lead patch from the fuse.

    Smoke from the firing was now so thick that it was virtually impossible to see and take bearings. Craven merely conned his ship in the direction of the noise and flashes of light ahead. But the tide carried the sloop over on the lee shore, perfectly positioned for the guns of Fort Jackson. As the sloop touched bottom, Craven saw the Manassas emerge from the smoke.

    Warley had previously tried to ram the Hartford without success. The Manassas had taken a number of Union shell hits and its smokestack was riddled and speed sharply reduced. Warley decided to take the ram down river to attack Porter’s now unprotected mortar boats. But when the Confederate forts mistakenly opened up with their heavy guns on the Manassas, Warley decided to return upriver. At that point he spotted the Brooklyn lying athwart the river and headed for Fort Jackson. Warley ordered resin thrown into his ship’s furnaces to produce maximum speed and maneuvered the ram so as to pin the Brooklyn against the riverbank.

    Seamen aboard the Brooklyn spotted the ram’s approach and gave the alarm. Craven ordered the sloop’s helm turned, but this could only lessen, not avoid, the impact. Only moments before the collision, a shot from the Manassas crashed into the Brooklyn but was stopped by sandbags piled around the steam drum.

    The Manassas struck the Union ship at a slight angle, crushing several planks and driving in the chain that had been protecting the ship’s side. Craven was certain his ship would go down, but the chain and a full coal bunker helped lessen the impact. Meanwhile, the Manassas disengaged and resumed its progress upriver.

    The tail of Farragut’s force, Porter’s mortar flotilla, was also under way. When his vessels came under fire as they approached Fort Jackson, Porter ordered the mortar boats to stop and open fire. This was about 4:20 a.m. The mortars fired for about a half hour, sufficient time it was thought for the remainder of the Union squadron to have cleared the forts. However, when Porter signaled a halt, some of the Union ships were still engaging the forts.

    In the thick smoke the Wissahickon, the last ship in the first division, grounded. As the sun rose, Lieutenant Albert N. Smith, the Wissahickon’s captain, discovered he was near three third-division ships, the Iroquois, Sciota, and Pinola, but also in the vicinity of the Confederate gunboat McRae, soon hotly engaged with the much more powerful Iroquois. The McRae was badly damaged in the exchange and Lieutenant Huger was mortally wounded 3 men were killed outright and another 17 were wounded.

    At this point the Manassas came on the scene. Warley tried without success to ram first the Iroquois and then the other Union ships. Realizing the danger if their ships were to be disabled close to the Confederate forts, the Union captains then broke off firing on the McRae and resumed their passage upriver.

    Three of Farragut’s ships failed to make it past the forts. The Kennebec and Itasca ran afoul of the river obstructions. In an effort to back clear, the Itasca then collided with the Winona. The Itasca then took a 42-pounder shot through its boiler and had to abandon the effort. The Winona was able to retire before dawn. The Kennebec, caught between the two Confederate forts at daybreak, also withdrew. Fourteen of the 17 ships in Farragut’s squadron had made it past the forts, however.

    Farragut lost one ship, the screw steamer Varuna, in the first division. At about 4:00 a. m., Lieutenant Beverly Kennon of the Louisiana state gunboat Governor Moore spotted the Varuna, which was faster than its sister ships and was advancing alone. Kennon immediately ordered the Governor Moore to attack but in order to reach the Varuna, it was obliged to run a hail of shot and shell from the other Union ships, which cut it up badly and killed and wounded a number of its crew. But the exchange of fire also produced so much smoke that the Confederate gunboat was able to escape and follow the Varuna upriver.

    Some 600 yards ahead of the trailing Union ships, the Governor Moore trailed the Varuna by 100 yards. The Union warship engaged its adversary with its stern chaser gun and repeatedly tried to sheer, so as to get off a broadside, but Kennon carefully mirrored the motions of his adversary and was thus able to avoid this. Nonetheless, the Governor Moore took considerable punishment. Shot from the Varuna’s stern chaser killed or wounded most of the crewmen on the Confederate vessel’s forecastle. With his own ship then only 40 yards from his adversary and his bow 32-pounder unable to bear because of the close range, Kennon ordered the gun’s muzzle depressed to fire a shell at the Union warship through his own ship’s deck. This round had a devastating effect, raking the Varuna.

    Kennon ordered a second shell fired, with similar result. With the two ships only about 10 feet apart and after firing a round from its after pivot gun, the Varuna sheered to starboard so as to loose a broadside, but Kennon could see the Union ship’s mastheads above the smoke and guessed what was intended. Swinging his own ship hard to port, he smashed it into the Union vessel. The Governor Moore then backed off and rammed the Varuna again, taking a full broadside from the Union ship in the process that made casualties of most of the Confederates on the weather deck. Shortly thereafter, however, another Confederate warship, the Stonewall Jackson, appeared and rammed the Varuna on its opposite, port, side. This blow produced such damage that the Varuna’s pumps were unable to keep it afloat, and Commander Charles S. Boggs ran his ship ashore. Having absorbed two broadsides from the mortally wounded Union vessel, the Stonewall Jackson was itself in a sinking state, and its captain ordered it also run ashore and burned to prevent capture.

    As he watched the Varuna ground, Kennon was faced with a new problem in the remaining rapidly closing Union ships, which soon subjected the Confederate gunboat to a devastating fire. His own ship in danger of going down in the river, Kennon grounded it just above the stricken Varuna and ordered it fired. The casualty toll on the Governor Moore was appalling. Fifty-seven men had been killed in action and 7 more wounded out of a crew of 93.

    As dawn broke, between 5:30 and 6:00 a. m., the Union ships assembled at Quarantine Station. At this point the Manassas suddenly appeared, heading for the squadron. Standing on the hurricane deck of the Mississippi, Lieutenant Dewey saw the Hartford, blackened from the recent fire, steaming by. Farragut was in its rigging and calling out “Run down the ram!” But when Warley saw the extent of his opposition, he knew the battle was over. The speed of the Manassas was now so much reduced, and it had sustained such damage that an attack would have been suicidal. Warley headed his ship ashore and ordered his crew to scatter.

    The battle for the lower Mississippi was over. With the Union fleet past the forts and the Confederate gunboats destroyed, there was now no barrier between Farragut’s squadron and New Orleans. Union casualties had been surprisingly light: the total from April 18 to April 26 was just 39 killed and 171 wounded. Farragut reported to Porter: “We had a rough time of it . . . but thank God the number of killed and wounded was very small considering.”

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    The Iron Brigade initially consisted of the 2nd, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Regiments, the 19th Indiana, Battery B of the 4th U.S. Light Artillery, and was later joined by the 24th Michigan. This particular composition of men, from the three Western states, led it to be sometimes referred to as the "Iron Brigade of the West". They were known throughout the war as the "Black Hats" because of the black 1858 model Hardee hats issued to Army regulars, rather than the blue kepis worn by most other Union Army units.

    The all-Western brigade, composed of Wisconsin, Michigan and Indiana troops, earned their famous nickname, while under the command of Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, who led the brigade into its first battle. On August 28, 1862, during the preliminary phases of the Second Battle of Bull Run, it stood up against attacks from a superior force under Maj. Gen Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson on the Brawner farm. The designation "Iron Brigade" is said to have originated during the brigade's action at Turners Gap, during the Battle of South Mountain, a prelude to the Battle of Antietam in September 1862. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding I Corps, approached Army of the Potomac commander Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, seeking orders. As the Western men advanced up the National Road, forcing the Confederate line all the way back to the gap, McClellan asked, "What troops are those fighting in the Pike?" Hooker replied, "[Brigadier] General Gibbon's brigade of Western men." McClellan stated, "They must be made of iron." Hooker said that the brigade had performed even more superbly at Second Bull Run to this, McClellan said that the brigade consisted of the "best troops in the world". Hooker supposedly was elated and rode off without his orders. There are a few stories related to the origin, but the men immediately adopted the name, which was quickly used in print after South Mountain. [1]

    The unit that eventually became known as the Iron Brigade was activated on October 1, 1861, upon the arrival in Washington, D.C., of the 7th Wisconsin. It was combined into a brigade with the 2nd and 6th Wisconsin, and the 19th Indiana, under the command of Brig. Gen. Rufus King and were originally known as King's Wisconsin Brigade. The governor of Wisconsin, Alexander Randall, had hoped to see the formation of an entirely Wisconsin brigade, but the Army unwittingly frustrated his plans by transferring the 5th Wisconsin from King's brigade and including the Hoosiers instead. [2] This brigade was initially designated the 3rd Brigade of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's division of the Army of the Potomac, and then the 3rd Brigade, I Corps. [3]

    McDowell's I Corps did not join the bulk of the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula Campaign. In June 1862 it was redesignated the III Corps of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia. Now under the command of John Gibbon, a regular Army officer from North Carolina who chose to stay with the Union, [4] King's brigade was designated the 4th Brigade, 1st Division, III Corps, and it saw its first combat in the Northern Virginia Campaign. Almost immediately following the Union defeat in the Second Battle of Bull Run, the III Corps was transferred back to the Army of the Potomac and redesignated the I Corps, under the command of Joseph Hooker Gibbon's brigade became the 4th Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps.

    The 24th Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment joined the brigade on October 8, 1862, prior to the Battle of Fredericksburg in December. On February 27, 1863, the brigade, now under the command of Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith, was redesignated the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps.

    The brigade commanders, disregarding temporary assignments, were:

    Brig. Gen. Rufus King: September 28, 1861 – May 7, 1862
    Brig. Gen. John Gibbon: May 7, 1862 – November 4, 1862
    Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith: November 25, 1862 – July 1, 1863 (wounded at Gettysburg)

    The Iron Brigade lost its all-Western status on July 16, 1863, following its crippling losses at Gettysburg, when the 167th Pennsylvania was incorporated into it. However, the brigade that succeeded it, which included the survivors of the Iron Brigade, was commanded by:

    Col. William W. Robinson (of the 7th Wisconsin): July 1, 1863 – March 25, 1864
    Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler (6th Wisconsin): March 25, 1864 – May 6, 1864
    Col. William W. Robinson: May 6, 1864 – June 7, 1864
    Brig. Gen. Edward S. Bragg (6th Wisconsin): June 7, 1864 – February 10, 1865
    Col. John A. Kellogg (6th Wisconsin): February 28, 1865 – April 27, 1865
    Col. Henry A. Morrow (24th Michigan): April 27, 1863 – June 5, 1865

    In June 1865, the units of the surviving brigade were separated and reassigned to the Army of the Tennessee.

    The brigade took pride in its designation, "1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps", under which it played a prominent role in the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863. It repulsed the first Confederate offensive through Herbst's Woods, capturing much of Brig. Gen. James J. Archer's brigade, and Archer himself. The 6th Wisconsin (along with 100 men of the brigade guard) are remembered for their famous charge on an unfinished railroad cut north and west of the town, where they captured the flag of the 2nd Mississippi and took hundreds of Confederate prisoners. [5] The Brigade survivors defended the north slope of Culp’s Hill on July 2,3, where the 6th Wisconsin made a night counterattack to restore Union positions previously lost to Confederate troops.

    The Iron Brigade, proportionately, suffered the most casualties of any brigade in the Civil War. For example, 61% (1,153 out of 1,885) were casualties at Gettysburg. Similarly, the 2nd Wisconsin, which suffered 77% casualties at Gettysburg, suffered the third highest total throughout the war it was third behind the 24th Michigan (also an Iron Brigade regiment) as well as the 1st Minnesota in total casualties at Gettysburg. The Michigan regiment lost 397 out of 496 soldiers, an 80% casualty rate. The 1st Minnesota actually suffered the highest casualty percentage of any Union regiment in a single Civil War engagement during the battle of Gettysburg, losing 216 out of 262 men (82%). [ citation needed ]

    The last surviving member of the Iron Brigade, Josiah E. Cass of Eau Claire, Wisconsin, died on 2 December 1947 of a fractured hip suffered in a fall. He was 100 years old. [6]

    The Iron Brigade prepared for battle, at Gettysburg, by anchoring the Union Army's southern flank, 10:00–10:45 a.m., on Day 1.

    Death of General John F. Reynolds as he supervised the deployment of the Iron Brigade early on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg

    The uniform of the Iron brigade differed some what to the standard uniform of the Union army at the time. It was designed to be more of a dress uniform that resembled a suit rather than the more common infantry men's kit. It consisted of:

    A Hardee black hat: A tall blocked, brimmed black hat, featuring a brass infantry bugle, a red I Corps circle patch and brass numbers/letters of the front to indicate units and companies. A brass eagle badge on the side used to hold the brim up in a slouch, and finally an ostrich feather plume.

    Union Frock coat.: A long, dark blue coat that came down to the mid thighs, resembling that of an officers coat. Fitted with a single breasted row of nine brass buttons, each with the federal eagle on them. The cuffs and collars had light blue trimming and two smaller brass buttons on the cuffs. The inside of the coat was lined with cotton to make a better fit.

    Light/dark blue trousers: depending on the period of the war and unit, trousers versed from light, sky blue to a dark blue the same colour as the coat. The trouser extended from the mid waist down to the ankles and had a pocket on either side.

    White canvas gaiter: white canvas leggings with leather straps to prevent stones and dirt getting into the shoes whilst in the field.

    All other equipment not mentioned included standard field equipment of the Union army consisting of canteens, belts, cartridge box, bayonet and scabbard, haversack and other various items of kit.

    The Springfield Model 1861 rifled musket, firing the .58 caliber projectile, was issued to the 6th Wisconsin, 19th Indiana, and 24th Michigan regiments. This single-shot, muzzle loading, percussion cap rifle weighed nine pounds with a barrel length of forty inches. It was the most widely issued infantry weapon used by Federal troops. The Second and Seventh Wisconsin used the Lorenz Rifle.

    "On the Union side, continental European firearms were mostly distributed to the Western armies--as such, the Lorenz Rifle was relatively uncommon in the Army of the Potomac (although two regiments of the famous Iron Brigade carried them) but heavily used by the Army of the Cumberland and Army of Tennessee." [ who? ]

    Union Army Edit

    There have been other brigades known by the same name. Another brigade in the Army of the Potomac had previously been known as the Iron Brigade, later the "Iron Brigade of the East" or "First Iron Brigade", to avoid confusion. This unit was the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps, prior to Meredith's brigade getting that designation. It consisted of the 22nd New York, 24th New York, 30th New York, 14th Regiment (New York State Militia), and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters. Although this Iron Brigade of the East served in the same infantry division as the Iron Brigade of the West, press attention focused primarily on the latter. Most of the Eastern regiments were mustered out before the Battle of Gettysburg, where the remaining Eastern Iron Brigade Regiments and the Iron Brigade of the West arguably achieved their greatest fame.

    Recent scholarship [7] identifies two other brigades referred to by their members or others as "The Iron Brigade": 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, III Corps (17th Maine, 3rd Michigan, 5th Michigan, 1st, 37th, and 101st New York) Reno's Brigade from the North Carolina expedition (21st and 35th Massachusetts, 51st Pennsylvania, and 51st New York)

    The Horn Brigade, a unit serving in the Western Theater, was known as the "Iron Brigade of the Army of the Cumberland." [8]

    Confederate Army - Shelby's Iron Brigade Edit

    Shelby's Iron Brigade was a Confederate cavalry brigade also known as the "Missouri Iron Brigade". The Confederate Iron Brigade was part of the division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph O. "Jo" Shelby, in the Army of Arkansas and fought in Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's Missouri Expedition, in 1864.

    Modern U.S. Army Edit

    The 2nd Brigade of the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division has carried the Iron Brigade moniker since 1985 and was previously called the "Black Hat" Brigade.

    The 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division was known as the Iron Brigade from its formation in 1917 through World War I, World War II and Vietnam, until some time in the early 2000s when, for reasons that are still unclear, the name was changed to Duke Brigade. The unit crest was an Iron Cross in a triangle, it appears that that was also changed. The 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division is also known as the Iron Brigade. Its unit crest is similar to the medals issued to veterans of the both Western and the Eastern Iron Brigades of the Army of the Potomac. [9] The 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division (United States) is known as the Iron Brigade as well. Located at Camp Casey, South Korea, the brigade has a critical role of military deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.

    The 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division (Spearhead), formerly stationed on Coleman Kaserne in Gelnhausen, Germany.

    The 157th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, also known as the Iron Brigade, is based out of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It was formerly known as the 57th Field Artillery Brigade, at which time its subordinate organizations included the 1st Battalion, 126th Field Artillery Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 121st Field Artillery Regiment from the Wisconsin Army National Guard, plus the 1st Battalion, 182nd Field Artillery Regiment of the Michigan Army National Guard. Not to be confused with the famous "Iron Brigade" of the Civil War, the 57th Field Artillery Brigade is also known as the "Iron Brigade," a nickname traditionally given to crack artillery units in the Civil War. It was during World War I that the 57th Field Artillery Brigade earned its nickname as it spent many hours at the front and fired more artillery rounds than any brigade in the American Army.

    The 32nd Infantry Division was an infantry division of the United States Army National Guard that fought primarily during World War I and World War II. It was formed with units from the states of Wisconsin and Michigan. With roots as the Iron Brigade in the American Civil War, the division's ancestral units came to be referred to as the Iron Jaw Division. The division was briefly called up during the Berlin Crisis in 1961. In 1967, the division was deactivated and reconstituted the 32nd Infantry Brigade of the Wisconsin Army National Guard only to be reorganized in 2007 as the 32nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team. The shoulder sleeve insignia currently worn is a red line shot through with a red arrow, giving them the nickname Red Arrow Brigade, which was earned in World War I where the 32nd Division was fighting the Germans alongside the French, who noted the unit's tenacity by punching through the German lines, like an arrow and calling the unit Les Terribles, meaning The Terrors.

    Sports Edit

    The name "Iron Brigade" has also been used to describe the offensive line of the University of Wisconsin Badger Football Team. The line is known for its size, strength, and dedication to the protection of the backfield. The Badgers play in Camp Randall Stadium, a site used to train Wisconsin volunteers during the Civil War.

    Dan Masters' Civil War Chronicles

    The study of the Civil War is a never ending but most pleasant journey through the libraries, historical societies, museums, cemeteries, backroads, and forgotten spaces of America. This blog focuses on the contributions made by Ohioans in the Civil War, but examines amazing Civil War stories wherever they are found.

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    How the Iron Brigade was Wrought: Gainesville through Antietam with the 2nd Wisconsin

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    Captain George H. Otis of the 2nd Wisconsin Volunteers sat down on Sunday morning September 21, 1862 overlooking the bloody battlefield of Antietam, and struggled to convey to his father his experiences over the last month. His regiment had participated in four significant engagements since August 28th, including two of the bloodiest battles of the entire war (Second Bull Run and Antietam) his regiment and company had been decimated, yet Otis escaped without a scratch. " My lieutenants are both gone," he wrote. "I am comparatively alone with 12 or 14 men, and I assure you I feel lonesome and at times moan and pine for old Wisconsin. I have seen so much, passed through such terrible fields of strife, that my heart sickens against war. I would gladly grasp the old stick and pick the types “as of yore.” [Otis was a typesetter before the war] But I came here to perform a part and that part, whatever it may be, I shall cheerfully perform to the end."

    The horrors of the battle of September 17 still were fresh in his mind, and the horrific wound suffered by one his lieutenants Oliver Sanford was perhaps the worst of all. " Lieutenant Oliver Sanford of my company had fell wounded in the head with his brains partly protruding, when I had him put in a blanket and carried to the rear," Otis noted. " I had Lieutenant Sanford carried to the hospital but the doctors gave him up. He is now at Keedysville under the care of George H. Legate. He is about the same and as yet unable to speak and at times is out of his head. The surgeons all agree that he cannot live." In less than a month, the Iron Brigade has suffered 1,700 casualties the 2nd Wisconsin was reduced to a bare handful of men.

    Captain Otis' letter to his father covering the battles of Gainesville, Second Bull, South Mountain, and Antietam was published on the first page of the october 8, 1862 edition of the Mineral Point Weekly Tribune.

    Captain George H. Otis, Co. I, 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry

    Camp of 2 nd Wisconsin Volunteers, Battlefield of Sharpsburg, Maryland

    The first opportunity offering, I avail to write you a long letter of our doings in Maryland. I doubt not but what the telegraph has informed you of our brilliant victories of Sunday and Monday last. They were, indeed, victories that this country may well be proud of. The newspapers have doubtless given you the meager accounts of the fights of Gainesville and Manassas. I cannot say that our was very much benefited in those three days’ struggles- but of the part that the Wisconsin troops took, I believe was performed with honor to themselves and the state.

    Colonel Edgar O' Conner
    2nd Wisconsin
    Killed in action August 28, 1862

    In the battle of Gainesville, our brigade suffered most terribly with a loss of 720 killed and wounded. Our brave little Colonel Edgar O’Conner was killed while he was cheering on his men to greater exertions. His last words to his men were “Boys, you’d nobly done your part. Stick to the old flag, fight, and if needs be, die for it.” He was buried close by the field and his place marked. In this battle our brigade was under fire one hour and ten minutes. My company suffered a loss of three killed and twelve wounded. Our boys done well and showed themselves capable of performing wonders. A braver, nobler set of men never held a musket.

    We left the Gainesville battlefield at 2 o’clock Friday morning, leaving our wounded men to fall into the hands of the enemy and our dead on the field unburied. It was hard to fall back to Manassas then, but there was no help for it. On Friday, we marched to the old Bull Run battlefield where a year ago a great battle had been fought, the results of which are undoubtedly familiar to all the world. During Friday, while the fresh troops were in battle, we were under the fire of the enemy’s artillery. It seemed rather hard to lay flat on one’s belly and hear those missiles drop and burst all around you.

    General John Gibbon once said that to be successful "an army commander must be as near a despot as the institutions of his country permit."

    Friday morning our regiment was consolidated with the 7 th Wisconsin under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lucius Fairchild, making a regiment about 500 men strong. On Saturday, our division was marched up to engage the enemy’s center, our brigade taking possession of an orchard and supporting Gibbon’s battery. Here our brigade was forced to undergo the terrors of a thorough rain of cannon balls, shells, and cannister. Our brigade’s loss in this engagement was 250 in killed and wounded. The brigade held its position until late at night covering the retreat of our forces to Centreville, where we were relieved by some of Smith’s division.

    L.B., soldier in 2nd Wisconsin

    In the forenoon, I had been detailed with a squad of 20 men to go to the field of Gainesville and have all the dead buried, but I had scarcely reached the field when the enemy’s skirmishers opened on us, and a battery sent a shell or two near us. We fell back, receiving orders to wait until the field was cleared, a thing that proved out of the question on Saturday. On Saturday, our brigade marched to Fairfax thence to Upton’s Hill where we remained a week before starting for Maryland. Our march to Frederick was a hard one and considering what our men had already undergone, it was a wonder how they held out.

    At Frederick, we overtook the Secesh and followed them to South Mountain. Our brigade was formed on the turnpike to the right and left and at dark, after having undergone the terrors of artillery duel, we marched up and opened on the enemy at the foot of the mountain. Previous to reaching the mountain, a shell from the enemy’s battery burst in our regiment, killing seven and wounding five. As usual with Jackson, his forces were behind a stone fence and in a ravine at that. After being under fire for some time, our regiment made a wheel, giving us a clear range on the Secesh behind the fence. Here our boys piled them up in heaps, most awful to speak of. The most of the Secesh appeared to be struck in the head. General Robert Lee, son of the Rebel General R.E. Lee, was killed, beside several colonels and majors on their side. We withdrew about 10 o’clock at night. During the time that General Hooker had drove the enemy on the right and General Reno had run them on the left, giving us three hours contest for possession of the field. In this engagement, our brigade suffered a loss of over 400. My company had five men wounded.

    This Model 1858 Remington .44 caliber revolver was carried by Captain George H. Otis during the Civil War and recently sold through Cowan Auctions.

    In this battle, as in the former, our men behaved most gallantly and nobly held their ground. The next morning [Monday September 15, 1862] we commenced the pursuit of the enemy, often capturing a large number of prisoners. Both Monday and Tuesday were occupied in cannonading and pushing forward close upon the heels of the retreating foes. Tuesday evening, we came upon their lines and lay down without supper and directly under their guns. During the night, heavy skirmishing and continual cannonading was kept up.

    At daylight, our brigade was ordered forward to open for the enemy. We were marching in division front and had reached a clump of woods when the enemy opened with a battery on us, but fortunately did not great harm to us but a shell burst in a division of the 6 th Wisconsin, killed several and wounding a number, how many I know not. We passed through the woods into an open field and through a cornfield with the 6 th Wisconsin on the right and a New York regiment on the left. We slowly crawled through the cornfield while Gibbon’s battery was throwing canister and shell into the enemy.

    This map depicts the forest of graves that lay upon the portion of the Antietam battlefield where the 2nd Wisconsin charged on the morning of September 17, 1862. The four regiments of Gibbon's Iron Brigade smashed straight into John Bell Hood's divisional counterattack near the Miller cornfield shortly after 7 a.m. in some of the hardest fighting of the Civil War.

    After passing through the cornfield into the open field, the enemy was discovered in great force on our right and left, leaving their center almost open. Cos. I and A had the first shot of the foe and soon the 6 th Wisconsin, 7 th Wisconsin, 19 th Indiana, and the New York regiments opened upon them. Then commenced the shower of bullets- volley after volley was poured in by the contending parties. It seemed as if it were a perfect rain of hail. In all battles I have not seen the like. I thought the battle of the 28 th bad enough, but this day’s battle seemed most horrible.

    Soon our regiment charged directly on the first company, giving us a crossfire on the enemy. Major Thomas S. Allen was wounded and had to leave the field, leaving Captain George B. Ely of Co. D in command. Our men were falling fast our ranks were thinned to where it seemed that we had scarce some 40 men left to defend our colors. All around me, men were falling, some begging to be carried off the field, others giving their last requests to some comrade. For once while standing there with but six of my own company left with the bullets flying all around me and man after man dropping here and there, I thought of the awful carnage of this dastardly work of taking the lives of human beings.

    The 14th Brooklyn, New York boys came up and with a cheer, our boys turned to them and asked them forward. With a hurrah they rushed through our ranks and opened on the enemy, our boys joining them. But it seemed as if the Secesh rose from the ground, for all of a sudden, a whole brigade of fresh Rebels and poured in on our distracted men volley upon volley of Minie balls. Then and not till then did it seem that the old brigade would give way. But alas, it slowly, gradually fell back till it passed through a column of fresh Union troops who marched forward to meet the exultant foe. Lieutenant Oliver Sanford of my company had fell wounded in the head with his brains partly protruding, when I had him put in a blanket and carried to the rear. Lieutenant Alexander Hill of Co. G was also wounded and carried to the rear as also was Lieutenant William W. Jones of Co. A. Our men what could served the wounded. As many as possible rallied around the old colors, and as soon as we reached the woods, a column was formed to stop stragglers coming from the field.

    Major General George B. McClellan

    My orderly sergeant William Noble (and a braver man never shouldered a musket) stuck by the colors and did his whole duty. He has been all to me, and his course and manly bearing has taught me to love the man. For his noble conduct, he deserves an honorable promotion. I had Lieutenant Sanford carried to the hospital but the doctors gave him up. He is now at Keedysville under the care of George H. Legate. He is about the same and as yet unable to speak and at times is out of his head. [Sanford lingered until October 13, 1862 when he died.] The surgeons all agree that he cannot live. I have sent by telegraph for some of his relations to come to him.

    Post-war image of Captain George H. Otis, 2nd Wisconsin. The captain later wrote a series giving the regimental history of the 2nd Wisconsin which was later published as a book.

    During the balance of the day, we lay in the open field and at night again underwent the tunes of a cannonading. This battle all day, the enemy being driven at all points. The number killed and wounded in our brigade was over 400. In the four battles, our brigade has suffered a loss of some 1,700 killed and wounded. What the loss can be of our army I cannot tell but it must be great. The Rebels have certainly in this last battle lost two to our one. The Rebels, under the cover of a flag of truce to bury their dead (which they failed to do), retreated across the river, leaving their wounded in our hands. But on the Virginia side, they run into the old Dutchman Sigel and undertook to cross back when they were met by our forces and brought to a standstill. As the thing now stands, the Secesh are in a bad fix and likely to be annihilated. Their whole army is here, and the thing must decide the fate of our government. It is either Confederacy or no Confederacy. Maryland and Pennsylvania are safe enough.

    Our late battle is an awful spectacle as only our troops have been buried. The Wisconsin boys were nicely interred and a fence built around their graves, the place marked, etc. If you should pass over that field, you would never go over another. The dead are so disfigured, swollen and black as ebony. If would seem out of the question for human beings to be treated so, but be it said, war has its evils. Strange to say, I have passed through all these battles without getting a scratch. My lieutenants are both gone. I am comparatively alone with 12 or 14 men, and I assure you I feel lonesome and at times moan and pine for old Wisconsin. I have seen so much, passed through such terrible fields of strife, that my heart sickens against war. I would gladly grasp the old stick and pick the types “as of yore.” But I came here to perform a part and that part, whatever it may be, I shall cheerfully perform to the end.

    Dunker Church in the background of this image looking across the Miller cornfield. Image courtesy of Phil Spaugy.

    Letter from Captain George H. Otis, Co. I “Miners Guards,” 2 nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, Mineral Point Weekly Tribune (Wisconsin), October 8, 1862, pg. 1

    Naval/Maritime History 21st of June - Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History

    The naval Battle of Vuelta de Obligado took place on the waters of the Paraná River on 20 November 1845, between the Argentine Confederation, under the leadership of Juan Manuel de Rosas, and a combined Anglo-French fleet. The action was part of the larger Anglo-French blockade of the Río de la Plata. Although the attacking forces broke through the Argentine naval defenses and overran the land defenses, the battle proved that foreign ships could not safely navigate Argentine internal waters against its government's wishes. The battle also changed political feeling in South America, increasing support for Rosas and his government.

    The Anglo-French armada forces its way through the Vuelta de Obligado

    During the 1830s and 1840s, the British and French governments were at odds with Rosas' leadership of the Argentine Confederation. Rosas' economic policies of requiring trade to pass through the Buenos Aires custom house – which was his method of imposing his will on the Littoral provinces – combined with his attempts to incorporate Paraguay and Uruguay to the Confederation, were in conflict with French and British economic interests in the region. During his government, Rosas had to face numerous problems with these foreign powers, which in some cases reached levels of open confrontation. These incidents included two naval blockades, the French blockade in 1838, and the Anglo-French of 1845.

    With the development of steam-powered sailing (which mainly took place in Great Britain, France and the United States) in the third decade of the 19th century, large merchant and military ships became capable of sailing up rivers at a good speed and with a heavy load. This new technology allowed the British and French governments to avoid the custom house in Buenos Aires by sailing directly through the La Plata estuary and engaging in commerce directly with inland cities in Entre Ríos, Corientes, Uruguay and Paraguay. This avoided Buenos Aires' taxation, guaranteed special rights for the Europeans and allowed them to export their products cheaply.

    Rosas' government tried to stop this practice by declaring the Argentine rivers closed to foreign countries, barring access to Paraguay and other ports in the process. The British and French governments did not acknowledge this declaration and decided to defy Rosas by sailing upstream with a joint fleet, setting the stage for the battle.

    Order of battle

    British and French boats assaulting the chain line at Obligado

    • British
      • Gorgon, paddle (6 guns, Capt. Charles Hotham)
      • Firebrand, paddle (6 guns, Capt. James Hope) (8 guns, Commander Bartholomew James Sulivan) (18 guns, Commander Edward Augustus Inglefield (acting)) (3 guns, Lieut. Reginald Thomas John Levinge)
      • Fanny, schooner (1 gun, Lieut. Astley Cooper Key)
      • San Martin (8 guns, Capt. François Thomas Tréhouart)
      • Fulton, paddle (2 guns, Lieut. Louis Mazères(fr))
      • Expéditive (16 guns, Lieut. Miniac)
      • Pandour (10 guns, Lieut. Duparc)
      • Procida (4 guns, Lieut. de la Rivière)

      The main Argentine redoubt was located on a cliff rising between 30 and 180 m over the banks at Vuelta de Obligado, where the river is 700 metres wide and a turn makes navigation difficult.

      The Argentine general Lucio N. Mansilla set up three thick metal chains suspended from 24 boats completely across the river, to prevent the advance of the European fleet. This operation was under the charge of an Italian immigrant named Filipo Aliberti. Only three of these boats were naval vessels the rest were requisitioned barges whose owners received a compensation in case of loss. Aliberti was the master of one of the boats, the Jacoba, sunk in the battle. At least 20 boats and barges were lost in the chain barrage at Obligado.

      Chain links and ammunition used by the Argentine forces during the battle

      On the right shore of the river the Argentines mounted four batteries with 30 cannons, many of them bronze 8, 10, 12 and 20-pounders. These were served by a division of 160 gaucho soldiers. There were also 2,000 men in trenches under the command of ColonelRamón Rodríguez (es), together with the brigantine Republicano (es) and two small gunboats, Restaurador and Lagos,[13][8] with the mission of guarding the chains across the river. Some sources increase the Argentine naval power to a third gunboat, the unarmed brigantine Vigilante, whose artillery had been dismounted and transferred to one of the batteries, eight armed launches and at least five armed barges.

      Main action
      The combat began at dawn, with intense cannon fire and rocket discharges over the Argentine batteries, which had less accurate and slower loading cannons. From the beginning the Argentines suffered many casualties — 150 dead, 90 wounded. Furthermore, the barges that held the chains were burnt down, and the Republicano was lost, blown up by its own commander when he was unable to defend it any longer. A number of armed launches were also sunk in battle. The gunboats Restaurador and Lagos disengaged successfully and withdrew up river, towards Tonelero pass. The third gunboat and the armed barges also survived the action, but the dismantled brigantine Vigilante was scuttled by her crew and the remaining launches were destroyed by the combined fleet on 28 November.

      Shortly after, the French steamer Fulton sailed through a gap open in the chain's barrier. Disembarked troops overcame the last defenders of the bluff, and 21 cannons fell into hands of the allied forces.

      The Europeans had won free passage at the cost of 28 dead and 95 wounded. However, the ships suffered severe damage, stranding them at Obligado for 40 days to make emergency repairs.

      Secondary action
      Meanwhile, 40 km to the north, a small Argentine naval force composed of the sloop Chacabuco, the gunboats Carmen, Arroyo Grande, Apremio and Buena Vista kept watch over a secondary branch of the Paraná whose control gives full access to the ports of Entre Ríos. Like at Obligado, a double chain held by seven barges was also deployed across the river. When news of the battle's outcome reached the squadron, the Chacabuco was scuttled and the remainder of the flotilla took shelter in the port of Victoria.

      Only 50 out of 92 merchantmen awaiting at Ibicuy Islands continued their upriver trip. The rest gave up and returned to Montevideo. The British and French ships that were able to sail past up river were again attacked on their way back at Paso del Tonelero and at Angostura del Quebracho on 4 June 1846. The combined fleet suffered the loss of six merchant ships during the later engagement.

      The Anglo-French victory did not achieve their economic objectives. It proved to be practically impossible to sail Argentine rivers without the authorisation of Argentine authorities.

      The battle had a great impact on the continent. Chile and Brazil changed their stance (until then they were against Rosas), and supported the Confederation. Even some Unitarian leaders, traditional enemies of the Argentine caudillo, were moved by the events, with General Martiniano Chilavert offering to join the Confederacy army.

      France and the United Kingdom eventually lifted the blockade and dropped their attempts to bypass Buenos Aires' policies. They acknowledged the Argentine government's legal right over the Paraná and other internal rivers, and its authority to determine who had access to it, in exchange for the withdrawal of Rosas's army from Uruguay.

      The Battle of Obligado is remembered in Argentina on 20 November, which was declared a "Day of National Sovereignty" in 1974, and became a national holiday in 2010. The French Paris Métro had a station named after this battle until 1947, when it was renamed Argentine, as a good-will gesture after the visit of Eva Perón to France.


      Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
      20 November 1861 – Launch of The second USS Oneida was a screw sloop-of-war in the United States Navy.

      The second USS Oneida was a screw sloop-of-war in the United States Navy. During the Civil War, she destroyed the CSS Governor Moore and served in blockade operations. She was attached to the Asiatic Squadron from 1867–1870. She sank in 1870 outside Yokohama, Japan after collision with the British steamer Bombay. The Court of Inquiry found the officers of Oneida were responsible for the collision. Bombay's captain was blamed for not staying at the scene to render assistance - a decision that caused some controversy] Japanese fishing boats saved 61 sailors but 125 men lost their lives. The American government made no attempt to raise the wreck and sold it to a Japanese wrecking company. The company recovered many bones from the wreck and interred them at their own expense. The Japanese erected a memorial tablet on the grounds of Ikegami Temple in Tokyo and held a Buddhist ceremony in the sailor's memory in May 1889.

      Library of Congress description: The sinking of the United States steamer Oneida off the port of Yokohama, Japan, Sunday, January 23


      Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
      20 November 1861 – Launch of USS Housatonic, was a screw sloop-of-war of the United States Navy,

      USS Housatonic was a screw sloop-of-war of the United States Navy, gaining its namesake from the Housatonic River of New England.

      Housatonic was launched on 20 November 1861, by the Boston Navy Yard at Charlestown, Massachusetts, sponsored by Miss Jane Coffin Colby and Miss Susan Paters Hudson and commissioned there on 29 August 1862, with Commander William Rogers Taylor in command. Housatonic was one of four sister ships which included USS Adirondack, USS Ossipee, and USS Juniata. Housatonic is recognized as being the first ship sunk in combat by a submarine when she was attacked and sunk by H.L. Hunley in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina.

      Service history
      Blockading Charleston
      Housatonic departed Boston on 11 September and arrived at Charleston, South Carolina, on 19 September to join the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. She took station outside the bar.

      Capture of Princess Royal and Confederate counter-attack
      On 29 January 1863, her boats, aided by those of USS Augusta, USS G. W. Blunt, and USS America, boarded and refloated the iron steamer Princess Royal. The gunboat Unadilla had driven the blockade runner ashore as she attempted to slip into Charleston from England with a cargo consisting of two marine engines destined for Confederate ironclads and a large quantity of ordnance and ammunition. These imports were of such great potential value to the South that they have been called "the war's most important single cargo of contraband."

      It is possibly in the hope of recovering this invaluable prize that the Confederate ironclad rams CSS Chicora and CSS Palmetto State slipped out of the main ship channel of Charleston Harbor to attack the Union blockading fleet in the early morning fog two days later. They rammed Mercedita, forcing her to strike her colors "in a sinking and perfectly defenseless condition", and moved on to cripple Keystone State. Gunfire from the rams also damaged Quaker City and Augusta before the Confederate ships withdrew under fire from Housatonic to the protection of shore batteries.

      Capture of Georgiana
      On 19 March 1863, Housatonic and Wissahickon, responding to signal flares sent up by America, chased the 407 ton iron-hulled blockade runner SS Georgiana ashore on Long Island, South Carolina. Georgiana's cargo of munitions, medicine and merchandise was then valued at over $1,000,000. Georgiana was described in contemporary dispatches and newspaper accounts as more powerful than the Confederate cruisers Alabama, Shenandoah, and Florida. This was a serious and very important blow to the Confederacy. The wreck of Georgiana was discovered by pioneer underwater archaeologist Lee Spence in 1965.

      Further captures, and attacks on Charleston
      Housatonic captured the sloop Neptune on 19 April as she attempted to run out of Charleston with a cargo of cotton and turpentine. She was credited with assisting in the capture of the steamer Seesh on 15 May. Howitzers mounted in Housatonic's boats joined in the attack on Fort Wagner on 10 July, which began the continuing bombardment of the Southern works at Charleston. In ensuing months her crew repeatedly manned boats which shelled the shoreline, patrolled close ashore gathering valuable information, and landed troops for raids against the outer defenses of Charleston.

      Sunk in the first submarine attack
      Main article: Sinking of USS Housatonic
      At just before 9pm, 17 February 1864, Housatonic, commanded by Charles Pickering, was maintaining her station in the blockade outside the bar. Robert F. Flemming, Jr., a black landsman, first sighted an object in the water 100 yards off, approaching the ship. "It had the appearance of a plank moving in the water," Pickering later reported. Although the chain was slipped, the engine backed, and all hands were called to quarters, it was too late. Within two minutes of the first sighting, the Confederate submarine H. L. Hunley rammed her spar torpedo into Housatonic's starboard side, forward of the mizzenmast, in history's first successful submarine attack on a warship. Before the rapidly sinking ship went down, the crew managed to lower two boats which took all the men they could hold most others saved themselves by climbing into the rigging which remained above water after the stricken ship settled on the bottom. Two officers and three men in Housatonic died. The Confederate submarine escaped but was lost with all hands not long after this action new evidence announced by archaeologists in 2013 indicates that the submarine may have been much closer to the point of detonation than previously realized, thus damaging the submarine as well. In 2017, researchers at Duke University further established through simulation that the Hunley's crew were most likely killed immediately at their posts by the blast's pressure wave damaging their lungs and brains.

      The wreck of Housatonic was largely scrapped in the 1870s–1890s and her location was eventually removed from coastal navigation charts and lost to history. The anchor of Housatonic can be found at the office of Wild Dunes on the Isle of Palms.


      Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
      Other Events on 20 November

      1683 – Launch of french Emporté, (ex-Trompeuse) 44 guns, at Dunkirk – condemned August 1705 and abandoned.

      Solide class, designed by F. Hendrick with 20 x 12-pounder, 20 x 6-pounder and 4 x 4-pounder guns:
      Sistership: Solide, (ex-Railleuse) 44 guns, launched 6 November 1683 at Dunkirk – wrecked August 1694 off Tortuga.

      1683 – Launch of French Emporte 44 at Dunkirk – condemned 1705 and abandoned

      1752 – Launch of Spanish África 74 at Cadiz - stricken 8 August 1806 and BU 1809

      1793 - French prize Scipion (74) caught fire and destroyed in Leghorn roads.

      In 1792, Scipion took part in operations against Nice, Villefranche and Oneille. In December, she joined the division under Admiral Latouche Tréville, and assisted the damaged Languedoc during the storm of 21 to 23 of that month.

      Captured by the British after the surrendering of Toulon by a Royalist cabale, she was commissioned with a crew of French rebels. On 28 November 1793, she caught fire by accident in the harbour of Livorno and exploded, killing 86 including her commanding officer, Captain Degoy

      1806 - Boats of HMS Success (1781 - 32), Cptn. John Ayscough, captured privateer felucca Le Vengeur, in Hidden Port near Cumberland Harbour, Cuba but she was sunk by fire from the shore.

      HMS Success was a 32-gun Amazon-class fifth-rate frigate of the British Royal Navy launched in 1781, which served during the American Revolutionary, French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The French captured her in the Mediterranean on 13 February 1801, but she was recaptured by the British on 2 September. She continued to serve in the Mediterranean until 1811, and in North America until hulked in 1814, then serving as a prison ship and powder hulk, before being broken up in 1820.

      Success destroys the Santa Catalina, 16 March 1782

      Early on 20 November 1806, while just east of Guantánamo Bay (known as Cumberland Harbour to the British), Ayscough observed a felucca running into Hidden Port. He sent the ship's barge and yawl in pursuit, but on reaching the shore they discovered that about 50 armed men had landed from the felucca, which was lashed to a tree, and had taken a position at the top of a small hill overlooking the beach, upon which they had mounted a single long gun. They fired grape and ball down on the British, killing the First Lieutenant, Mr. Duke, with their first volley. The British withstood the enemy fire for an hour and twenty minutes, suffering seven more men wounded, and having the barge shot through in several places before Lieutenant Spence, then in command, deemed any attempt on the hill a useless sacrifice, so ordered the enemy ship to be towed out, which was achieved under heavy fire. She proved to be the French privateer Vengeur, which had sailed from Santo Domingo on 1 October, but being badly damaged she sank while under tow.[

      1806 - Boats of HMS Orpheus (32), Cptn. Thomas Briggs, captured Spanish schooner Dolores (3) in Campeachy Bay

      HMS Orpheus was a 32–gun fifth rate frigate of the Royal Navy. She was launched in 1780, and served for more than a quarter of a century, before she was wrecked in 1807

      1823 – Launch of HMS Rainbow, a 28 gun Atholl-class corvette

      Scale 1:48. Plan showing the body plan, sheer lines with some midship framing and longitudinal half breadth for Ranger (1820), Tweed (1823), Rainbow (1823), Rattlesnake (1822), Crocodile (1825),Success (1825), Talbot (1824) and with alterations for Alligator (1821), Samarang (1822), Herald (1822) - ex Termagant, and later for North Star (1820), Daphne (cancelled 1832), Porcupine (cancelled 1832), Nimrod (1828) – ex Andromache, Alarm (cancelled 1826), all 28-gun Sixth Rate Sloops. Signed Joseph Tucker and Robert Seppings (Surveyors of the Navy) Annotation at the top right: "Mem: The Head was altered agreeably to a sketch dated Nov 6th 1821." Annotation on the right: " 14th May 1823. The following ships were ordered to be built agreeably to the alterations in ticked lines in the fore body viz Alarm, Crocodile, Daphne, Porcupine and Sucess." "2nd June 1830. The main rails of the head of the Talbot was directed to be moved 8ins and the Birthing rails about fuurther from the side at the front of the supporters." Annoted in pencil at bottom right: "Memo ? ? lines for the Model."

      Scale: 1:48. A contemporary half block model of HMS Rainbow (1823), a 28 gun sixth rate sloop. The hull is carved form a solid block of wood(?) and is painted a metallic copper colour below the main wales separated by a thin white line along the waterline. The topsides are painted black, with the main gundeck highlighted by a creamy white horizontal band. The gunports on the forecastle, main and quarter decks are let into the hull and painted black. The bow is fitted with head rails just aft of the three quarter length figurehead. The stern is complete with carved galleries, painted black, below which is the rudder fitted to a near vertical sternpost. The whole model is mounted on a rectangular wooden backboard which is painted a creamy white surrounded by a stained moulded edging. The number "(15)" is painted in white on the lower backboard edge amidships.

      1856 - During the Second Opium War, 287 Marines and Sailors from U.S. Navy ships USS Levant, Portsmouth, and San Jacinto land at Canton, China under the command of Cmdr. Andrew Foote. This action opens up diplomatic relations with China and the U.S. gains neutrality.

      The first USS Levant was a second-class sloop-of-war in the United States Navy.
      Levant was launched on 28 December 1837 by New York Navy Yard and commissioned on 17 March 1838, with Commander Hiram Paulding in command.

      1942 - Ending of Operation Stone Age (16–20 November 1942), an Allied convoy operation to the Mediterranean island of Malta in the Second World War.

      Operation Stoneage or Operation Stone Age (16–20 November 1942) was an Allied convoy operation to the Mediterranean island of Malta in the Second World War. To disguise the destination of the ships, some took on their cargo at Port Sudan in the Red Sea. The four ships of Convoy MW 13 sailed from Alexandria on 16 September, escorted by cruisers, destroyers and round-the-clock air cover, from captured Axis airfields in Egypt and Cyrenaica (eastern Libya).

      A complimentary convoy fromom Gibraltar was cancelled when the First Army, landed in Morocco and Algeria in Operation Torch (8–16 November) made less progress along the Algerian coast than expected. MW 13 sailed about 40 nmi (46 mi 74 km) out from the African coast as far west as Benghazi, then turn north for Malta. The Axis retreat along the Libyan coast was monitored by the Bletchley Park code-breakers of the German Enigma coding machine, which revealed the inability of Panzerarmee Afrika to counter-attack the Allies.

      At dusk on 18 November, another attack by Axis torpedo-bombers hit the cruiser 6 in (15 cm) cruiser HMS Arethusa forward of the bridge and killed 155 members of the crew. Arethusa made a slow voyage back to Alexandria, being towed backwards and then continuing backwards on one engine. MW 13 arrived at Malta at 1:30 a.m. on 20 November, which broke the Axis Siege of Malta (11 June 1940 – 20 November 1942).


      Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
      21 November 1742 - sloop HMS Drake (1741 - 14) and several other ships like two fine Xebecs belonging to the King, three ships with stores for the garrison and a large Settee storeship, besides several Portuguese vessels lost in a violent storm in Gibraltar Bay

      HMS Drake was an 8-gun snow-rigged sloop of the Royal Navy, launched in 1741 as the first of three Drake class sloops constructed for convoy duty during the Anglo-Spanish War of Jenkins' Ear from 1739 to 1742. After limited service off the Channel Islands, she was sailed to Gibraltar where she was wrecked in 1742 while under the temporary command of her first lieutenant.

      No Scale. Plan showing the body plan, sheer lines with inboard detail, and longitudinal half-breadth of Drake (1741), Hawke (1741), and Swift (1741), all 8-gun Sloops.

      Drake was the first of three small, fast vessels designed by Surveyor of the Navy Jacob Acworth to guard merchant convoys in British home waters after the declaration of war against Spain in 1739. She was ordered in June 1740, to be constructed by shipwright Thomas West in the civilian dockyard at Deptford. Her dimensions were in keeping with other vessels of her class with an overall length of 85 ft 1.5 in (25.9 m), a beam of 23 ft 9.25 in (7.2 m) and measuring 206 43⁄94 tonnes burthen.

      • 85 ft 1.5 in (25.9 m) (overall)
      • 68 ft 8.6 in (20.9 m) (keel)
      • 8 × 4pdrs
      • 12 × 1/2pdr swivels

      Active service
      Drake was commissioned in February 1741 under Commander Frederick Rogers. She assisted convoys in waters surrounding the Channel Islands for the remainder of that year, then sailed for Gibraltar in December. There the captaincy was transferred to Commander John Pitman, and six months later to Commander John Stringer who continued her convoy duties in the Channel and off Gibraltar itself.

      On 22 November 1742, Drake was under the temporary command of Lieutenant Nathaniel Stephens when she was wrecked in Gibraltar harbour and left in an unsalvageable condition. The wreck lay abandoned on the Gibraltar shore for several years it was finally sold out of service on 13 October 1748.

      No Scale. Plan showing basic fittings of upper deck, and fore and aft platforms for Drake (1741) and Hawke (1741), both 8-gun Sloops.

      The Snow is a vessel with two masts, fore and main, both of which are fully square-rigged. stepped immediately behind the mainmast is the so-called snow-mast on which a trysail with a boom is carried.

      Two views of a naval snow, by Charles Brooking (1759)


      Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
      21 November 1779 - HMS Hussar (1763 - 28), Cptn. Elliott Salter, took Nostra Senora del Buen Confegio (26).

      HMS Hussar was a sixth-rate frigate of the Royal Navy, built in England in 1761-63. She was a 28-gun ship of the Mermaid class, designed by Sir Thomas Slade. She was wrecked at New York in 1780.

      In early 2013, a cannon from Hussar was discovered stored in a building in New York's Central Park still loaded with live gunpowder and shot

      Scale 1:48. Plan showing the body plan, sheer lines and longitudinal half breadth for building Hussar (1763), a 28-gun, Fifth Rate Frigate, at Rotherithe by Robert Inswood. Signed Thomas Slade (Surveyor of the Navy 1755-71)

      • 124 ft 4 in (37.9 m) (gundeck)
      • 103 ft 8 1⁄2 in (31.6 m) (keel)
      • Upper deck: 24 × 9 pounder (4 kg) cannon, : 4 × 3 pounder (1.4 kg) cannon + 12 swivel guns.

      Hussar was commissioned in August 1763 under Captain James Smith, and sent for her commission cruising in the vicinity of Cape Clear. By 1767 she was commanded by Captain Hyde Parker. She continued to serve off North America between 1768 and 1771, before paying off into ordinary in March 1771. After being repaired and refitted at Woolwich from 1774 to 1777, she recommissioned in July 1777 under Captain Elliott Salter. In later life, she was part of the British fleet in North America. During the American Revolution, Hussar carried dispatches on the North American station.

      Hussar captured the Spanish ship of the line Nuestra Señora del Buen Confeso (armed en flute), on 20 November 1779.

      By mid-1780, the British position in New York was precarious as a French army had joined forces with General George Washington's troops north of the city.

      When Admiral Sir George Brydges Rodney took his twenty ships of the line south in November, it was decided that the army's payroll be moved to the anchorage at Gardiners Bay on eastern Long Island. On 23 November 1780, against his pilot's better judgment, Hussar's captain, Charles Pole, decided to sail from the East River through the treacherous waters of Hell Gate between Randall's Island and Astoria, Queens (on Long Island). Just before reaching Long Island Sound, Hussar was swept onto Pot Rock and began sinking. Pole was unable to run her aground and she sank in 16 fathoms (29 m) of water. The minutes of the Royal Navy's court martial into the loss of the frigate (record held at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich), make no mention of any payroll money or other special cargo aboard. The document appears to be little more than an administrative formality. It suggests that whatever valuables were aboard the Hussar had been off-loaded by the time of her accident.

      Salvage attempts
      Although the British immediately denied there was any gold aboard the ship, and despite the difficulty of diving in the waters of Hell Gate, reports of $2 to $4 million in gold were the catalyst that prompted many salvage efforts over the next 150 years. This continued even after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers eased the passage through the East River by blowing "the worst features of Hell Gate straight back to hell" with 56,000 pounds (25 t) of dynamite in 1876. Hussar's remains, if any survive, are now believed to lie beneath landfill in the Bronx.

      On January 11, 2013, preservationists with the Central Park Conservancy in New York were removing rust from a cannon from Hussar when they discovered it still contained gunpowder, wadding, and a cannonball. Police were called and bomb disposal staff eventually removed about 1.8 pounds of active black gunpowder from the cannon, which they disposed of at a gun range. “We silenced British cannon fire in 1776 and we don’t want to hear it again in Central Park,” the New York Police Department said in a statement.

      In popular culture
      In Kim Stanley Robinson's 2017 science fiction novel New York 2140, a sub-plot centers on an attempt to recover two chests with gold from the wreck of the HMS Hussar that lies buried under a submerged parking lot in the former Bronx.

      The Mermaid -class frigates were a group of six 28-gun sailing frigates of the sixth rate designed in 1760 by Sir Thomas Slade, based on the scaled-down lines of HMS Aurora (originally a French prize, L'Abénaquise, which had been captured in 1757).

      Scale: 1:48. Plan showing the body plan, stempost and rudder elevation, and bow and head elevation for Aurora (captured 1757), a captured French Frigate. The plan is headed under the common misspelling of her French name, and suggests that it is dated before 22 June 1758, when she was renamed Aurora, and then fitted as 38-gun Fifth Rate Frigate at Portsmouth Dockyard. The plan includes an undated typed set of notes relating to the ship's name Sellotaped to the front of the plan.

      The contract for the prototype was agreed on 12 May 1760, for a ship to be launched within twelve months, and her name was assigned as Mermaid on 28 October 1760. The contract for the second ship was agreed on 10 March 1762, for a ship to be launched within thirteen months, and the contract for the third ship was agreed on 2 April 1762, for a ship to be launched within fourteen months both names were assigned on 30 April 1763.

      Some ten years after the design was first produced, it was re-used for a second batch of three ships which were ordered on Christmas Day, 1770. While the design differences from the first batch were minor (the keel was a few inches longer), the second batch were normally designated the Modified Mermaid class.

      Scale 1:48. Plan showing the body plan, sheer lines and longitudinal half breadth as proposed and approved for Mermaid (1761), a 28-gun, Fifth Rate Frigate, for building at Hull by Mr Blaydes, and later for Hussar (1763) and Soleby (1763), also 28-gun, Fifth Rate Frigates, similar to the French Aurora (Abienakise 1757). The sheer was altered for these two ships. Annotation on the reverse: "A copy of this Draught was given to Messers Hugh & Beris Blaydes for building a ship agreeable there to May 1760 Named the Mermaid. Another Copy of this Body & Lines with the sheer part agreeable to another Draught a little alter'd there to 20th March 1762 - Nam'd the Hussar. Another of the same as above was given to Mr Thos Airey & Co for Building the ship agreeable there to at Newcastle upon Tyne 10th April 1762 - Named the - Solebay."

      • 612 72/94 (first batch as designed)
      • 617 22/94 (second batch as designed)
      • 124 ft 0 in (38 m) (gundeck)
      • 102 ft 8.125 in (31 m) (keel - first batch)
      • 103 ft 4.75 in (32 m) (keel - second batch)
      • UD: 24 × 9-pounder guns
      • QD: 4 × 3-pounder guns
      • From 1780
      • UD: 24 × 9-pounder guns
      • QD 4 × 6-pounder guns and 18-pounder carronades
      • FC: 2 × 18-pounder carronades
        • Ordered: 24 April 1760
        • Built by: Hugh Blaydes, Hull.
        • Keel laid: 27 May 1760
        • Launched: 6 May 1761
        • Completed: September 1761 at the builder's yard.
        • Fate: Run ashore to avoid capture by the French 8 July 1778.
        • Ordered: 30 January 1762
        • Built by: Thomas Inwood, Rotherhithe.
        • Keel laid: 1 April 1762
        • Launched: 26 August 1763
        • Completed: 7 November 1763 at Deptford Dockyard.
        • Fate: Wrecked in Hell's Gate passage, New York, on 24 November 1779.
        • Ordered 30 January 1762
        • Built by: Thomas Airey & Company, Newcastle.
        • Keel laid: 10 May 1762
        • Launched: 9 September 1763
        • Completed: December 1763 at the builder's yard, then 2 January to 15 March 1764 at Sheerness Dockyard.
        • Fate: Wrecked off Nevis Island and burnt to avoid capture 25 January 1782.
          • Ordered: 25 December 1770
          • Built by: Henry Adams, Bucklers Hard.
          • Keel laid: February 1771
          • Launched: 20 July 1773
          • Completed: October 1775 to 9 January 1776 at Portsmouth Dockyard.
          • Fate: Wrecked off Deal 16 August 1781.
          • Ordered: 25 December 1770
          • Built by: Henry Adams, Bucklers Hard.
          • Keel laid: February 1771
          • Launched: 1 October 1773
          • Completed: 15 October 1773 to 4 November 1775 at Portsmouth Dockyard.
          • Fate: Taken to pieces at Deptford Dockyard in January 1796.
          • Ordered: 25 December 1770
          • Built by: Hugh Blaydes & Hodgson, Hull.
          • Keel laid: May 1771
          • Launched: 23 August 1774
          • Completed: 13 September 1774 to 23 October 1775 at Chatham Dockyard.
          • Fate: Sold at Sheerness Dockyard May 1802

          Captured by the Royal Navy in 1757, she was renamed HMS Aurora and saw active service in the latter half of the Seven Years' War. She was broken up for timber at Plymouth Dockyard in 1763.

          • 144 ft 0 in (43.89 m) (gundeck)
          • 118 ft 9 in (36.20 m) (keel)
          • 38 guns comprising
          • Upper deck: 28 × 12-pounder cannons
          • Lower deck: 8 × 18-pounder cannons
          • Quarterdeck 2 × 6-pounder cannons

          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          21 November 1808 - HMS Dedaigneuse (1797 - 36), Cptn. William Beauchamp Proctor, engaged French frigate Semillante (1791 - 32) off Mauritius.

          The Dédaigneuse was a 40-gun Coquille-class frigate of the French Navy, launched in 1797. The Royal Navy captured her in 1801 and took her into service as HMS Dedaigneuse. She was hulked as a receiving ship in 1812 and sold in 1823.

          lines & profile NMM, Progress Book, volume 5, folio 743, states that 'Dedaigneuse' (1801) arrived at Plymouth Dockyard on 20 February 1801, was docked on 29 July 1801 and her copper was replaced. She was undocked on 24 August, and sailed on 9 November 1801 having been fitted.

          French service
          On 30 December 1800, as she was taking political prisoners at Cayenne to bring them back to France under Captain Prevost Lacroix, she spotted Tamar.

          On Monday, 26 January 1801, at 8.00 a.m., at 45°N 12°W, Oiseau, under Captain Samuel Hood Linzee, fell in with and chased Dédaigneuse, which was bound from Cayenne to Rochefort with despatches. By noon the following day, with Cape Finisterre in sight, Captain Linzee signalled Sirius and Amethyst who were in sight to join the pursuit. Dédaigneuse maintained her advantage until 2.00 a.m. on the 28th when the Oiseaux and Sirius were within musket-shot of Dédaigneuse. In a desperate attempt to shake her pursuers she opened fire from her stern-chasers, which fire the two British ships immediately returned. After a running fight of 45 minutes, Dédaigneuse was two miles off shore near Cape Bellem with her running rigging and sails cut to pieces, mainly due to the steady and well-directed fire from Sirius. Aboard Dédaigneuse casualties were heavy with several men killed, including her Captain and fifth Lieutenant, and 17 wounded she was therefore forced to strike her colours . Amethyst, due to unfavourable winds, was unable to get up until after Dédaigneuse had struck. Although Sirius was the only British ship damaged (rigging, sails, main-yard and bowsprit) in the encounter, there were no fatalities on the English side. Captain Linzee declared the encounter a long and anxious chase of 42 hours and acknowledged a gallant resistance on the part of Dédaigneuse. Linzee also described her as "a perfect new Frigate, Copper fastened and sails well. ". He sent her into Plymouth with a prize crew under the command of his first lieutenant, H. Lloyd. Dédaigneuse was afterwards added to Royal Navy under the same name HMS Dedaigneuse.

          British service
          In July 1805 Commander William Beauchamp-Proctor was given acting-command of Dedaigneuse. He was not confirmed in his post-rank until 5 September 1806.

          On 21 November 1808, at sunset, Dédaigneuse was stationed off the Isle de France when she encountered the French 36-gun frigate Sémillante returning from a cruise in the Indian Ocean. Dédaigneuse gave chase and by midnight the two ships were no more than half a mile apart. Dédaigneuse fired two or three shots from her bow-chasers, and then a full broadside, as Sémillante tacked. Dédaigneuse followed suit, but because of the lightness of the wind, the ship would not come round. A boat was lowered down to tow her round, and she was finally able to pursue the Frenchman, now some distance ahead. Unfortunately, Dédaigneuse had lost a great deal of copper, being very foul, and at best a bad working ship, so gradually dropped further astern. Beauchamp-Proctor eventually abandoned the chase at about 5 p.m, and soon afterwards Sémillante anchored in Port Louis. Dédaigneuse continued to patrol the waters off the Isle de France until her water and provisions were almost expended, before sailing to Madagascar to reprovision, and then sailed to Bombay. When the commander-in-chief expressed himself dissatisfied with his conduct, Captain Beauchamp-Proctor requested a court-martial, which was held aboard Culloden in Bombay harbour on 27 March 1809. Every officer of his ship gave strong evidence in the captain's favour, and the court acquitted him of all blame, laying responsibility squarely on the poor sailing qualities of Dédaigneuse.

          Dedaigneuse was eventually sold in April 1823.

          • Patriote (launched October 1794 at Bayonne) – renamed Coquille on 30 May 1795.
          • Fidèle (launched 1795 at Bayonne) – renamed Sirène on 30 May 1795. , (launched 17 October 1797 at Bayonne) - taken into British Navy on 28 May 1803 as HMS Franchise. , (launched December 1797 at Bayonne) - taken by the British on 28 January 1801, keeping her name. , (launched 13 August 1799 at Bayonne).

          The Sémillante (French: "Shiny" or "Sparkling") was a 32-gun frigate of the French Navy, lead ship of her class. She was involved in a number of multi-vessel actions against the Royal Navy, particularly in the Indian Ocean. She captured a number of East Indiamen before she became so damaged that the French disarmed her and turned her into a merchant vessel. The British captured her and broke her up in 1809.

          Defence of the Centurion in Vizagapatam Road, Septr. 15th 1804, Engraving by Thomas Sutherland after a painting by Sir James Lind

          Class and type: Sémillante-class frigate
          Displacement: 600 tons (French)
          Length: 45.5 m (149 ft)Beam:11.5 m (38 ft)
          Draught :5.5 m (18 ft)
          Sail plan: Full-rigged ship
          Armament: 26 × 12-pounder long guns + 6 × 6-pounder guns

            , 32 guns (launched 25 November 1791 at Lorient) – sold in September 1808 for commercial use. , 32 guns (launched 27 April 1793 at Lorient – captured by American Navy in February 1799, becoming USS Insurgent.

          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          21 November 1839 – Launch of French Inflexible, a 90-gun Suffren-class Ship of the line of the French Navy

          The Inflexible was a 90-gun Suffren-class Ship of the line of the French Navy.

          Commissioned in Rochefort in 1840, Inflexible was appointed to the Mediterranean squadron, where she served from 1841 under Captain Guérin des Essarts.
          From 1860, she was used as a boys' school in Brest, and was eventually broken up in 1875

          Inflexible as a boys' school

          • 1824-1839:
          • 30 × 30-pounder long guns on lower deck
          • 32 × 30-pounder short guns on middle deck
          • 24 × 30-pounder carronades and 4 × 18-pounders on upper decks
          • 1839-1840
          • 26 × 30-pounder long guns and 4 × 22cm Paixhans guns on lower deck
          • 32 × 30-pounder short guns on middle deck
          • 24 × 30-pounder carronades and 4 × 16 cm Paixhans guns on upper decks

          The Suffren class was a late type of 90-gun ships of the line of the French Navy.

          The design was selected on 30 January 1824 by the Commission de Paris, an appointed Commission comprising Jean-Marguerite Tupinier, Jacques-Noël Sané, Pierre Rolland, Pierre Lair and Jean Lamorinière. Intended as successors of the 80-gun Bucentaure class and as the third of four ranks of ships of the line, they introduced the innovation of having straight walls, instead of the tumblehome design that had prevailed until then this tended to heighten the ships' centre of gravity, but provided much more room for equipment in the upper decks. Stability issues were fixed with underwater stabilisers.

          Only the first two, Suffren and Inflexible, retain the original design all through their career the others were converted to steam and sail during their construction.

          • Suffren 90 (launched 27 August 1829 at Cherbourg)
          • Inflexible 90 (launched 21 November 1839 at Rochefort)

          Straight walls of an arsenal model of Suffren, with the lower long 30-pounder battery, the upper short 30-pounder battery, and the 30-pounder carronades on the deck


          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          21 November 1910 – Sailors on board Brazil's warships including the Minas Geraes, São Paulo, and Bahia, violently rebel in what is now known as the Revolta da Chibata (Revolt of the Lash).

          The Revolt of the Lash (Portuguese: Revolta da Chibata) was a naval mutiny in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in late November 1910. It was the direct result of the use of whips ("lashes") by white naval officers when punishing Afro-Brazilian and mulatto enlisted sailors.

          The leader of the Revolt of the Lash, João Cândido Felisberto (front row, directly to the left of the man in the dark suit), with reporters, officers and sailors on board Minas Geraes on 26 November 1910.

          In 1888, Brazil became the last country in the Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery. The move was opposed by Brazilian elites, and they led a successful coup d'état in 1889. The resulting instability contributed to several revolts and rebellions, but at the beginning of the new century rising demand for coffee and rubber enabled Brazilian politicians to begin plotting the country's transformation into an international power. A key part of this would come from modernizing the Brazilian Navy, which had been neglected since the revolution, by purchasing battleships of the new "dreadnought" type. While enormously expensive, these two dreadnoughts garnered much international attention before their delivery in 1910.

          Social conditions in the Brazilian Navy, however, were not keeping pace with the new technology. Elite white officers were in charge of mostly black and mulatto crews, many of whom had been forced into the navy on long-term contracts. These officers frequently utilized corporal punishment on their crewmen for even minor offenses, something that had been banned in most other countries and in the rest of Brazil. In response, sailors used the new warships for a carefully planned and executed mutiny on 22 November 1910. They took control of both new dreadnoughts, one of the cruisers and an older warship—a total that gave the mutineers the kind of firepower that dwarfed the rest of the Brazilian Navy. Led by João Cândido Felisberto, the mutineers sent a letter to the government that demanded an end to what they called the "slavery" being practiced by the navy.

          While the executive branch of the Brazilian government plotted to retake or sink the rebelling warships, they were hampered by personnel distrust and equipment problems historians have since cast doubt on their chances of successfully accomplishing either. At the same time, Congress—led by Rui Barbosa, a senator—pursued a route of amnesty, appointing a former navy captain as their liaison to the rebels. This latter route was successful, and a bill granting amnesty to all involved and ending the use of corporal punishment passed the lower house by a veto-proof margin. However, many of the sailors were quickly discharged from the navy, and after an unrelated second rebellion took place a few weeks later, many of the original mutineers were rounded up and thrown into jail or sent to work camps on the rubber plantations to the north.

          Minas Geraes, spelled Minas Gerais in some sources, was a dreadnought battleship of the Brazilian Navy. Named in honor of the state of Minas Gerais, the ship was laid down in April 1907 as the lead ship of its class, making the country the third to have a dreadnought under construction and igniting a naval arms race between Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.

          Minas Gerais sailing soon after her commissioning. Photo was taken too early to be of Sao Paulo, which is a common identification in sources.

          Two months after its completion in January 1910, Minas Geraes was featured in Scientific American, which described it as "the last word in heavy battleship design and the . most powerfully armed warship afloat".[8] In November 1910, Minas Geraeswas the focal point of the Revolt of the Lash. The mutiny spread from Minas Geraes to other ships in the Navy, including its sister São Paulo, the elderly coastal defense ship Deodoro, and the recently commissioned cruiser Bahia. Led by the "Black Admiral" João Cândido Felisberto, the mutineers threatened to bombard the Brazilian capital of Rio de Janeiro if their demands were not met. As it was not possible to end the situation militarily—the only loyal troops nearby being small torpedo boatsand army troops confined to land—the National Congress of Brazil gave in and the rebels disbanded.

          When Brazil entered the First World War in 1917, Britain's Royal Navy declined Brazil's offer of Minas Geraes for duty with the Grand Fleet because the ship was outdated it had not been refitted since entering service, so range-finders and a fire-control system had not been added. São Paulo underwent modernization in the United States in 1920 in 1921, Minas Geraes received the same treatment. A year later, Minas Geraes sailed to counter the first of the Tenente revolts. São Paulo shelled the rebels' fort, and they surrendered shortly thereafter Minas Geraes did not fire its guns. In 1924, mutineers seized São Paulo and attempted to persuade the crews of Minas Geraes and several other ships to join them, but were unsuccessful.

          Minas Geraes was modernized at the Rio de Janeiro Naval Yard in the 1930s, and underwent further refitting from 1939 to 1943. During the Second World War, the ship was anchored in Salvador as the main defense of the port, as it was too old to play an active part in the war. For the last nine years of its service life, Minas Geraes remained largely inactive, and was towed to Italy for scrapping in March 1954.

          Revolt of the Lash
          Main article: Revolt of the Lash
          The initial spark was provided on 16 November 1910 when Afro-Brazilian sailor Marcelino Rodrigues Menezes was brutally flogged 250 times for insubordination. The sailor's back was later described by José Carlos de Carvalho, a retired navy captain assigned to be the Brazilian government's representative to the mutineers, as "a mullet sliced open for salting." Many Afro-Brazilian sailors were sons of former slaves, or were former slaves freed under the Lei Áurea (abolition) but forced to enter the navy. They had been planning a revolt for some time, and Menezes became the catalyst. The revolt began aboard Minas Geraes at around 10 pm on 22 November the ship's commander and several loyal crewmen were murdered in the process. Soon after, São Paulo, the new cruiser Bahia, the coast-defense ship Deodoro, the minelayer República, the training ship Benjamin Constant, and the torpedo boats Tamoio and Timbira all revolted with relatively little violence. The first four ships represented the newest and strongest ships in the navy Minas Geraes, São Paulo, and Bahiahad been completed and commissioned only months before. Deodoro was twelve years old and had recently undergone a refit. The crews of the smaller warships made up only two percent of the mutineers, and some moved to the largest ships after the revolt began.

          Afro-Brazilian and pardo sailors pose for a photographer on board Minas Geraes, probably during the ship's visit to the United States in early 1913.

          The ships were well-supplied with foodstuffs, ammunition, and coal, and the only demand of mutineers—led by João Cândido Felisberto—was the abolition of what they called slavery: they objected to low pay, long hours, inadequate training, and punishments including bolo (being struck on the hand with a ferrule) and the use of whips or lashes (chibata), which eventually became a symbol of the revolt. By the 23rd, the National Congress had begun discussing the possibility of a general amnesty for the sailors. Senator Ruy Barbosa, long an opponent of slavery, lent a large amount of support, and the measure unanimously passed the Federal Senate on 24 November. The measure was then sent to the Chamber of Deputies.

          Humiliated by the revolt, naval officers and the president of Brazil were staunchly opposed to amnesty, so they quickly began planning to assault the rebel ships. The officers believed such an action was necessary to restore the service's honor. The rebels, believing an attack was imminent, sailed their ships out of Guanabara Bay and spent the night of 23–24 November at sea, only returning during daylight. Late on the 24th, the President ordered the naval officers to attack the mutineers. Officers crewed some smaller warships and the cruiser Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia's sister ship with ten 4.7-inch guns. They planned to attack on the morning of the 25th, when the government expected the mutineers would return to Guanabara Bay. When they did not return and the amnesty measure neared passage in the Chamber of Deputies, the order was rescinded. After the bill passed 125–23 and the president signed it into law, the mutineers stood down on the 26th.

          During the revolt, the ships were noted by many observers to be well handled, despite a previous belief that the Brazilian Navy was incapable of effectively operating the ships even before being split by a rebellion. João Cândido Felisberto ordered all liquor thrown overboard, and discipline on the ships was recognized as exemplary. The 4.7-inch guns were often used for shots over the city, but the 12-inch guns were not, which led to a suspicion among the naval officers that the rebels were incapable of using the weapons. Later research and interviews indicate that Minas Geraes' guns were fully operational, and while São Paulo's could not be turned after salt water contaminated the hydraulic system, British engineers still on board the ship after the voyage from the United Kingdom were working on the problem. Still, historians have never ascertained how well the mutineers could handle the ships.

          The crews of the torpedo boats remained loyal to the government, and army troops moved to the presidential palace and the coastline, but neither group could stop the mutineers a major problem for the authorities was that many of the men who manned Rio de Janeiro's harbor defenses were sympathetic to the mutineers' cause. The additional possibility of the capital being bombarded forced the National Congress of Brazil to give in to the rebels' demands. The demands included the abolition of flogging, improved living conditions, and the granting of amnesty to all mutineers. The government also issued official pardons and a statement of regret. Its submission resulted in the rebellion's end on 26 November, when control of the four ships was handed back to the navy.

          In 1913, Minas Geraes took the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lauro Müller, to the United States, reciprocating the visit U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root had paid to Brazil seven years earlier.


          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          21 November 1912 – Launch of Japanese battleship Hiei, a Kongo-class battleship

          Hiei (比叡) was a warship of the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War I and World War II. Designed by British naval architect George Thurston, she was the second launched of four Kongō-class battlecruisers, among the most heavily armed ships in any navy when built. Laid down in 1911 at the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, Hiei was formally commissioned in 1914. She patrolled off the Chinese coast on several occasions during World War I, and helped with rescue efforts following the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake.

          Hiei in her 1942 configuration

          Starting in 1929, Hiei was converted to a gunnery training ship to avoid being scrapped under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty. She served as Emperor Hirohito's transport in the mid-1930s. Starting in 1937, she underwent a full-scale reconstruction that completely rebuilt her superstructure, upgraded her powerplant, and equipped her with launch catapults for floatplanes. Now fast enough to accompany Japan's growing fleet of aircraft carriers, she was reclassified as a fast battleship. On the eve of the US entry into World War II, she sailed as part of Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's Combined Fleet, escorting the six carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

          As part of the Third Battleship Division, Hiei participated in many of the Imperial Japanese Navy's early actions in 1942, providing support for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) as well as the Indian Ocean raid of April 1942. During the Battle of Midway, she sailed in the Invasion Force under Admiral Nobutake Kondō, before being redeployed to the Solomon Islands during the Battle of Guadalcanal. She escorted Japanese carrier forces during the battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands, before sailing as part of a bombardment force under Admiral Kondō during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. On the evening of 13 November 1942, Hiei engaged American cruisers and destroyers alongside her sister ship Kirishima. After inflicting heavy damage on American cruisers and destroyers, Hiei was crippled by enemy vessels. Subjected to continuous air attack, she sank on the evening of 14 November 1942.

          Design and construction
          Hiei was the second of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Kongō-class battlecruisers, a line of capital ships designed by the British naval architect George Thurston. The class was ordered in 1910 in the Japanese Emergency Naval Expansion Bill after the commissioning of HMS Invincible in 1908.[3] The four battlecruisers of the Kongō class were designed to match the naval capabilities of the other major powers at the time they have been called the battlecruiser versions of the British (formerly Turkish) battleship HMS Erin. With their heavy armament and armor protection (the latter of which made up 23.3% of their approximately 30,000 ton displacement), Hiei and her sister ships were vastly superior to any other Japanese capital ship afloat at the time.

          Hiei's fitting out in Yokosuka, September 1913

          The keel of Hiei was laid down at Yokosuka Naval Arsenal on 4 November 1911, with most of the parts used in her construction manufactured in Britain. She was launched on 21 November 1912, and fitting-out began in December 1913. On 15 December 1913, Captain Shichitaro Takagi was assigned as her chief equipping officer. She was completed on 4 August 1914.

          Hiei's main battery consisted of eight 14-inch (36 cm) heavy-caliber main guns in four twin turrets, two forward and two aft. The turrets were noted by the US Office of Naval Intelligence to be "similar to the British 15-inch turrets", with improvements made in flash-tightness in the gun chambers. Each of her main guns could fire high-explosive or armor-piercing shells 38,770 yards (19.14 nmi 35.45 km) at a rate of two shells per minute. In keeping with the Japanese doctrine of deploying more powerful vessels than their opponents, Hiei and her sister ships were the first vessels in the world equipped with 14-inch (36 cm) guns. The main guns carried ammunition for ninety shots and had an approximate gun-life of 250–280 shots. In 1941, dyes were introduced for the armor-piercing shells of the four Kongo-class battleships to assist their gunners in distinguishing the hits from a distance, with Hiei's armor-piercing shells using black dye.

          Her secondary battery was originally sixteen 6-inch (15 cm) 50-caliber medium guns in single casemates (all located amidships), eight 3-inch (7.6 cm) guns and eight submerged 21-inch (53 cm) torpedo tubes. The sixteen 6-inch/50 caliber guns were capable of firing between 5 and 6 rounds per minute, with a barrel life of 500 rounds. The 6-inch/50 caliber gun was capable of firing both antiaircraft and antiship shells, though the positioning of the guns on Hiei made antiaircraft firing impractical. The eight 5-inch/40 caliber guns added later could fire between 8 and 14 rounds per minute, with a barrel life of 800–1500 rounds. These guns had the widest variety of shot type of Hiei's guns, being designed to fire antiaircraft, antiship, and illumination shells. Hiei was also armed with a large number of 1-inch (2.5 cm) Type 96 antiaircraft autocannons

          The Kongō -class battlecruiser (金剛型巡洋戦艦 Kongō-gata jun'yōsenkan) was a class of four battlecruisers built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) immediately before World War I. Designed by British naval architect George Thurston, the lead ship of the class, Kongō, was the last Japanese capital ship constructed outside Japan, by Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness.[1] Her sister ships Haruna, Kirishima and Hiei were all completed in Japan.

          During the late 1920s, all but Hiei were reconstructed and reclassified as battleships. After the signing of the London Naval Treaty in 1930, Hiei was reconfigured as a training ship to avoid being scrapped. Following Japan's withdrawal from the London Naval Treaty, all four underwent a massive second reconstruction in the late 1930s. Following the completion of these modifications, which increased top speeds to over 30 knots (56 km/h 35 mph), all four were reclassified as fast battleships.

          The Kongō-class battleships were the most active capital ships of the Japanese Navy during World War II, participating in most major engagements of the war. Hiei and Kirishima acted as escorts during the attack on Pearl Harbor, while Kongō and Haruna supported the invasion of Singapore. All four participated in the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal. Hiei and Kirishima were both lost during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942, while Haruna and Kongō jointly bombarded the American Henderson Field airbase on Guadalcanal. The two remaining Kongō-class battleships spent most of 1943 shuttling between Japanese naval bases before participating in the major naval campaigns of 1944. Haruna and Kongō engaged American surface vessels during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Kongō was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine USS Sealion in November 1944, while Haruna was sunk at her moorings by an air attack in Kure Naval Base in late July 1945, but later raised and scrapped in 1946

          Due to a lack of available slipways, the latter two were the first Japanese warships to be built by Japanese private shipyards. Completed by 1915, they were considered the first modern battlecruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy.[1] According to naval historian Robert Jackson, they "outclassed all other contemporary [capital] ships". The design was so successful that the construction of the fourth battlecruiser of the Lion-class—HMS Tiger—was halted so that design features of the Kongō class could be added.


          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          21 November 1916 – Mines from SM U-73 sink the HMHS Britannic, the largest ship lost in the First World War.

          HMHS Britannic (/brɪˈtænɪk/) was the third and final vessel of the White Star Line's Olympic class of steamships and the second to bear the name "Britannic." She was the fleet mate of both the RMS Olympic and the RMS Titanic and was intended to enter service as a transatlantic passenger liner.

          Britannic was launched just before the start of the First World War. She was designed to be the safest and most luxurious of the three ships, drawing lessons from the sinking of the Titanic. She was laid up at her builders, Harland and Wolff, in Belfast for many months before being put to use as a hospital ship in 1915. In 1915 and 1916 she served between the United Kingdom and the Dardanelles. On the morning of 21 November 1916 she was shaken by an explosion caused by a naval mine near the Greek island of Kea and foundered 55 minutes later, killing 30 people.

          HMHS Britannic seen during World War I

          There were 1,065 people on board the 1,035 survivors were rescued from the water and lifeboats. Britannic was the largest ship lost in the First World War. The loss of the ship was compensated by the award of SS Bismarck to the White Star Line as part of post-war reparations she became the RMS Majestic.

          The wreck was located and explored by Jacques-Yves Cousteau in 1975. The vessel is the largest passenger ship on the sea floor, followed by Titanic

          Last voyage

          The location of Kea in the Cycladesarchipelago in the Aegean Sea

          The channel between Kea (left) and Makronisos Britannic sank closer to Kea

          After completing five successful voyages to the Middle Eastern theatre and back to the United Kingdom transporting the sick and wounded, Britannic departed Southampton for Lemnos at 14:23 on 12 November 1916, her sixth voyage to the Mediterranean Sea.[28]Britannic passed Gibraltar around midnight on 15 November and arrived at Naples on the morning of 17 November, for her usual coalling and water refuelling stop, completing the first stage of her mission.

          A storm kept the ship at Naples until Sunday afternoon, when Captain Bartlett decided to take advantage of a brief break in the weather and continue. The seas rose once again just as Britannic left the port. By next morning, the storms died and the ship passed the Strait of Messina without problems. Cape Matapan was rounded in the first hours of 21 November. By the morning, Britannic was steaming at full speed into the Kea Channel, between Cape Sounion (the southernmost point of Attica, the prefecture that includes Athens) and the island of Kea.

          There were 1,065 people on board: 673 crew, 315 Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) and 77 nurses.

          At 08:12 on 21 November 1916, a loud explosion shook the ship. The cause, whether it was a torpedo from an enemy submarine or a mine, was not apparent. It would later be revealed that the mines were planted in the Kea Channel on 21 October 1916 by SM U-73 under the command of Gustav Sieß. The reaction in the dining room was immediate doctors and nurses left instantly for their posts but not everybody reacted the same way, as further aft, the power of the explosion was less felt and many thought the ship had hit a smaller boat. Captain Bartlett and Chief Officer Hume were on the bridge at the time and the gravity of the situation was soon evident. The explosion was on the starboard side, between holds two and three. The force of the explosion damaged the watertight bulkhead between hold one and the forepeak. The first four watertight compartments were filling rapidly with water, the boiler-man's tunnel connecting the firemen's quarters in the bow with boiler room six was seriously damaged, and water was flowing into that boiler room.

          Bartlett ordered the watertight doors closed, sent a distress signal, and ordered the crew to prepare the lifeboats. An SOS signal was immediately sent out and was received by several other ships in the area, among them were HMS Scourge and HMS Heroic, but Britannic heard nothing in reply unknown to either Bartlett or the ship's wireless operator, the force of the first explosion had caused the antenna wires slung between the ship's masts to snap. This meant that although the ship could still send out transmissions by radio, she could no longer receive them.

          Along with the damaged watertight door of the firemen's tunnel, the watertight door between boiler rooms six and five failed to close properly. Water was flowing further aft into boiler room five. Britannic had reached her flooding limit. She could stay afloat (motionless) with her first six watertight compartments flooded. There were five watertight bulkheads rising all the way up to B Deck. Those measures had been taken after the Titanic disaster (Titanic could float with her first four compartments flooded). The next crucial bulkhead between boiler rooms five and four and its door were undamaged and should have guaranteed the ship's survival. There were open portholes along the front lower decks, which tilted underwater within minutes of the explosion. The nurses had opened most of those portholes to ventilate the wards, against standing orders. As the ship's angle of list increased, water reached this level and began entering aft from the bulkhead between boiler rooms five and four. With more than six compartments flooded, Britannic could not stay afloat.

          On the bridge, Captain Bartlett was already considering efforts to save the ship, despite its increasingly dire condition. Only two minutes after the blast, boiler rooms five and six had to be evacuated. In about ten minutes, Britannic was roughly in the same condition Titanic had been in one hour after the collision with the iceberg. Fifteen minutes after the ship was struck, the open portholes on E Deck were underwater. With water also entering the ship's aft section from the bulkhead between boiler rooms four and five, Britannic quickly developed a serious list to starboard due to the weight of the water flooding into the starboard side. With the shores of the Greek island Kea to the right, Bartlett gave the order to navigate the ship towards the island in attempt to beach the vessel. The effect of the ship's starboard list and the weight of the rudder made attempts to navigate the ship under its own power difficult, and the steering gear was knocked out by the explosion, which eliminated steering by the rudder. The captain ordered the port shaft driven at a higher speed than the starboard side, which helped the ship move towards the island.

          At the same time, the hospital staff prepared to evacuate. Bartlett had given the order to prepare the lifeboats, but he did not allow them to be lowered into the water. Everyone took their most valuable belongings with them before they evacuated. The chaplain of the ship recovered his Bible. The few patients and nurses on board were assembled. Major Harold Priestley gathered his detachments from the Royal Army Medical Corps to the back of the A deck and inspected the cabins to ensure no one was left behind.

          While Bartlett continued his desperate manoeuvre, the ship listed more and more. The other crew members began to fear that the list would become too large, and so they decided to put the first lifeboat onto the water without waiting for the order to do so. Bartlett then decided to stop the ship and her engine. Before he could do so, two lifeboats were put onto the water on the port side. The still-turning partly-surfaced propeller sucked the two lifeboats into it, mincing them, along with their passengers. Bartlett was then finally able to stop the propellers before they could suck in another lifeboat.

          Final moments

          HMHS Britannic sinking

          By 08:45, the list was so great that even the gantry davits were now inoperable. At this point, Bartlett concluded that the rate at which Britannic was sinking had slowed so he called a halt to the evacuation and ordered the engines restarted in the hope that he might still be able to beach the ship. At 09:00 Bartlett was informed that the rate of flooding had increased due to the ship's forward motion and that the flooding had reached D-deck. Realising that there was now no hope of reaching land in time, Bartlett gave the final order to stop the engines and sounded two final long blasts of the whistle, the signal to abandon ship.[50] As water had already reached the bridge, he and Assistant Commander Dyke walked off onto the deck and entered the water, swimming to a collapsible boat from which they continued to co-ordinate the rescue operations.

          Britannic rolled over onto her starboard side and the funnels collapsed one by one as it rapidly sank. By the time the stern was out of the water, the bow had already slammed into the sea floor, causing major structural damage to it, before completely slipping beneath the waves at 09:07.[50] Violet Jessop (who was also one of the survivors of Britannic's sister-ship Titanic, and had even been on the third sister, Olympic, when she collided with HMS Hawke) described the last seconds

          "She dipped her head a little, then a little lower and still lower. All the deck machinery fell into the sea like a child's toys. Then she took a fearful plunge, her stern rearing hundreds of feet into the air until with a final roar, she disappeared into the depths, the noise of her going resounding through the water with undreamt-of violence. "
          It was 09:07, only 55 minutes after the explosion. Britannic was the largest ship lost in the First World War.


          Survivors of the Britannic on board a destroyer

          Captain John Cropper of the RAMC, lost in the sinking

          Compared to Titanic, the rescue of Britannic was facilitated by three factors: the temperature was higher (21 °C (70 °F) compared to −2 °C (28 °F) for Titanic), more lifeboats were available (35 were launched and stayed afloat compared to Titanic's 20[57]) and help was closer (arrived less than two hours after first distress call[56] compared to three and a half hours for Titanic.)

          The first to arrive on the scene were fishermen from Kea on their caïque, who picked many men from the water.[59] At 10:00, HMS Scourge sighted the first lifeboats and 10 minutes later stopped and picked up 339 survivors. Armed boarding steamer HMS Heroichad arrived some minutes earlier and picked up 494. Some 150 had made it to Korissia, Kea, where surviving doctors and nurses from Britannic were trying to save the injured, using aprons and pieces of lifebelts to make dressings. A little barren quayside served as their operating room.

          Scourge and Heroic had no deck space for more survivors, and they left for Piraeus signalling the presence of those left at Korissia. HMS Foxhound arrived at 11:45 and, after sweeping the area, anchored in the small port at 13:00 to offer medical assistance and take on board the remaining survivors. At 14:00 the light cruiser HMS Foresight arrived. Foxhound departed for Piraeus at 14:15 while Foresight remained to arrange the burial on Kea of RAMC Sergeant William Sharpe, who had died of his injuries. Another two men died on the Heroic and one on the French tug Goliath. The three were buried with military honours in the Piraeus Naval and Consular Cemetery. The last fatality was G. Honeycott, who died at the Russian Hospital at Piraeus shortly after the funerals.

          In total, 1,035 people survived the sinking. Thirty men lost their lives in the disaster but only five were buried others were not recovered and are honoured on memorials in Thessaloniki (the Mikra Memorial) and London. Another 38 men were injured (18 crew, 20 RAMC).[62] Survivors were accommodated in the warships that were anchored at the port of Piraeus while nurses and officers were hosted in separate hotels at Phaleron. Many Greek citizens and officials attended the funerals. Survivors were sent home and few arrived in the United Kingdom before Christmas.

          In November 2006, Britannic researcher Michail Michailakis discovered that one of the 45 unidentified graves in the New British Cemetery in the town of Hermoupolis on the island of Syros contained the remains of a soldier collected from the church of Ag. Trias at Livadi (the former name of Korissia). Maritime historian Simon Mills contacted the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Further research established that this soldier was a Britannic casualty and his remains had been registered in October 1919 as belonging to a certain "Corporal Stevens". When the remains were moved to the new cemetery at Syros in June 1921, it was found that there was no record relating this name with the loss of the ship, and the grave was registered as unidentified. Mills provided evidence that this man could be Sergeant Sharpe and the case was considered by the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency. A new headstone for Sharpe was erected and the CWGC has updated its database.


          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          21 November 1921 - The Carrier Dove was a 4-masted schooner built by the Hall Brothers in Port Blakely in 1890 wrecked

          The Carrier Dove was a 4-masted schooner built by the Hall Brothers in Port Blakely in 1890. She worked in the West coast lumber trade and in fishing

          Career of 1890 schooner Carrier Dove
          In 1893, Carrier Dove was active in the foreign lumber trade out of British Columbia. The Alaska Packers Association also described Carrier Dove as a "salmon vessel" which had sustained a partial loss at sea amounting to $11,500, in 1893. In 1894, she loaded lumber at Nanaimo under Capt. Brandt. She was used for fishing between 1902-1907. On Nov. 19, 1903, while at sea in the vicinity of Juneau, AK, a seaman named John Macas jumped overboard. "A boat was launched and man picked up, but died soon afterwards."

          Carrier Dove took a load of lumber from Masset Inlet, B.C. to Port Adelaide in 1919-1920.

          On 27 February 1920, Carrier Dove ran aground on a reef at Levuka, Fiji. She was refloated, repaired, and returned to service.

          1912 - San Pedro, CA - 4 masted schooner Carrier Dove, dockside, unloading her wares

          1921 shipwreck
          Schooner Carrier Dove was wrecked after striking a reef near the Hawaiian island of Molokai on 21 November 1921. She had become "waterlogged and unmanageable while on a voyage from Tonga Island for San Francisco with copra." The Pacific Marine Review reported that the loss of the "Moore schooner Carrier Dove" was estimated at "$77,000 cargo, no hull."

          "Two tons of copra from the wreck were gathered up four days later on the Kai-lua beach on Oahu." The wreck was still "visible on the ocean bottom" as of 2002.


          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          21 November 1944 – World War II: American submarine USS Sealion (SS 315) sinks the Japanese battleship Kongō and Japanese destroyer Urakaze in the Formosa Strait.

          USS Sealion (SS/SSP/ASSP/APSS/LPSS-315), a Balao-class submarine, was the second ship of the United States Navy to be named for the sea lion, any of several large, eared seals native to the Pacific. She is sometimes referred to as Sealion II, because her first skipper, Lieutenant Commander Eli Thomas Reich, was a veteran of the first Sealion, serving on her when she was lost at the beginning of World War II.

          Her keel was laid down on 25 February 1943 by the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut. She was launched on 31 October 1943 sponsored by Mrs. Emory S. Land, and commissioned on 8 March 1944.

          Sinking of Kongō and Urakaze
          At 0020 on 21 November, she made radar contact with an enemy formation moving through the Taiwan Strait at about 16 knots (30 km/h) and not zig-zagging.

          By 0048, the pips were made out to be two cruisers and two battleships. At 0146, three additional ships, escorts—one on either beam of the formation and one on the starboard quarter—became visible. Sealion had in fact intercepted a powerful surface fleet consisting of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, and Kongō, the cruiser Yahagi, and the destroyers Hamakaze, Isokaze, Urakaze, Yukikaze, Kiri, and Ume.

          At 0245, Sealion, ahead of the task force, turned in and slowed for the attack. Eleven minutes later, she fired six torpedoes at the second ship in line, Kongō. At 0259, she fired three at Nagato. At 0300, her crew saw and heard three hits from the first salvo, flooding two of Kongō's boiler rooms and giving her a list to port. Nagato, alerted by the explosions, turned hard and the Sealion's second salvo missed ahead, running on to hit and sink Urakaze the destroyer's magazines were hit by the torpedo. She blew up and sank quickly with the loss of all hands on board, including ComDesDiv 17 Yokota Yasuteru.

          Sealion opened to the westward. The Japanese searched to the east. By 0310, the submarine had reloaded and began tracking again with the thought that the torpedoes had only dented the battleship's armor belt.

          The Japanese formation, however, had begun zig-zagging and the sea and wind had increased. At 0450, the enemy formation split into two groups. Sealion began tracking the slower group consisting of Kongō, Isokaze and Hamakaze. At 0524, a tremendous explosion lit the area and Kongō disappeared.

          It was customary in American submarines to mark a name on the head of each torpedo as it was loaded into the tube nest. They usually bore the names of the torpedo crews' wives or best girls. Some carried the names of the factory employee who had sold the most war bonds during a given period. That night, however, four of Sealion's fish, as they raced out of their tubes, carried the names Foster, O'Connell, Paul and Ogilvie—the men who had been killed in the bombing of Sealion I three years earlier.

          It was not customary for the crews of American submarines to make audio recordings of their attacks. However, the Sealion crew had obtained a sound recorder left behind by a CBS war correspondent who had debarked at Midway, and when ordered to battle stations after encountering the Japanese battle group, one sailor positioned the microphone by an intercom in the conning tower. That recording,[9] along with a similar recording[9] of an attack on a Japanese oiler during the Sealion's fifth patrol, were then preserved by the Naval Underwater Sound Laboratory, and are thought to be the only surviving sound recordings of World War II submarine attacks.

          Kongō (金剛, "Indestructible Diamond", named for Mount Kongō) was a warship of the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War I and World War II. She was the first battlecruiser of the Kongō class, among the most heavily armed ships in any navy when built. Her designer was the British naval engineer George Thurston, and she was laid down in 1911 at Barrow-in-Furness in Britain by Vickers Shipbuilding Company. Kongō was the last Japanese capital ship constructed outside Japan. She was formally commissioned in 1913, and patrolled off the Chinese coast during World War I.

          Kongō underwent two major reconstructions. Beginning in 1929, the Imperial Japanese Navy rebuilt her as a battleship, strengthening her armor and improving her speed and power capabilities. In 1935, her superstructure was completely rebuilt, her speed was increased, and she was equipped with launch catapults for floatplanes. Now fast enough to accompany Japan's growing carrier fleet, Kongō was reclassified as a fast battleship. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Kongō operated off the coast of mainland China before being redeployed to the Third Battleship Division in 1941. In 1942, she sailed as part of the Southern Force in preparation for the Battle of Singapore.

          Kongō fought in a large number of major naval actions of the Pacific War during World War II. She covered the Japanese Army's amphibious landings in British Malaya (part of present-day Malaysia) and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) in 1942, before engaging American forces at the Battle of Midway and during the Guadalcanal Campaign. Throughout 1943, Kongō primarily remained at Truk Lagoon in the Caroline Islands, Kure Naval Base (near Hiroshima), Sasebo Naval Base (near Nagasaki), and Lingga Roads, and deployed several times in response to American aircraft carrier air raids on Japanese island bases scattered across the Pacific. Kongō participated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944 (22–23 October), engaging and sinking American vessels in the latter. Kongō was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine USS Sealion while transiting the Formosa Strait on 21 November 1944. She was the only Japanese battleship sunk by submarine in the Second World War.

          Kongō under attack during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, 20 June 1944

          In January 1944, Kongō was dry-docked for a reconfiguration of her anti-aircraft suite. Four 6-inch guns and a pair of twin 25 mm mounts were removed and replaced with four 5-inch guns and four triple 25 mm mounts. The Third Battleship Division departed Kure on 8 March 1944. Arriving at Lingga on 14 March 1944, the division remained for training until 11 May 1944. On 11 May 1944, Kongō and Admiral Ozawa's Mobile Fleet departed Lingga for Tawitawi, where they were joined by Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita's "Force C". On 13 June, Ozawa's Mobile Fleet departed Tawitawi for the Mariana Islands. During the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Kongō escorted Japanese fast carriers, and remained undamaged in counterattacks from US carrier aircraft on 20 June. When she returned to Japan, 13 triple and 40 single 25-mm mounts were added to her anti-aircraft armament, for a total of over 100 mounts. In August, two more 6-inch guns were removed and another eighteen single mounts installed.

          In October 1944, Kongō departed Lingga in preparation for "Operation Sho-1", Japan's counterattack during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval engagement in history. On 24 October, Kongō was undamaged by several near misses from American carrier aircraft in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. On 25 October, during the Battle off Samar, Kongō—as part of Admiral Kurita's Centre Force—engaged the US 7th Fleet's "Taffy 3", a battlegroup of escort carriers and destroyers. She succeeded in scoring numerous hits on the escort carrier Gambier Bay as well as the destroyers Hoel and Heermann. At 09:12, she sank the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts. After a fierce defensive action by the American ships, which sank three Japanese heavy cruisers, Admiral Kurita elected to withdraw, ending the battle. While retreating, Kongō suffered damage from five near misses from attacking aircraft. The fleet arrived at Brunei on 28 October.

          On 16 November, following a US air raid on Brunei, Kongō along with Yamato, Nagato and the rest of the First Fleet, departed Brunei for Kure in preparation for a major reorganization of the fleet and battle repairs. On 20 November, they entered the Formosa Strait. Shortly after midnight on 21 November, the submarine USS Sealion made radar contact with the fleet at 44,000 yards (40,000 m). Maneuvering into position at 02:45, Sealion fired six bow torpedoes at Kongō followed by three stern torpedoes at Nagato fifteen minutes later. One minute after the first salvo was launched, two of the torpedoes were seen to hit Kongō on the port side, while a third sank the destroyer Urakaze with all hands. The torpedoes flooded two of Kongō's boiler rooms, but she was still able to make 16 kn (30 km/h 18 mph). By 05:00, she had slowed to 11 kn (20 km/h 13 mph) and was given permission to break off from the fleet and head to the port of Keelung in Formosa along with the destroyers Hamakaze and Isokaze as escort.

          Within fifteen minutes of detaching from the main force, Kongō was listing 45 degrees and flooding uncontrollably. At 5:18 the ship lost all power and the order was given to abandon ship. At 5:24, while the evacuation was under way, the forward 14-inch magazine exploded and the broken ship sank quickly with the loss of over 1,200 of her crew including the commander of the Third Battleship Division and her captain. The escort destroyers Hamakaze and Isokaze rescued 237 survivors.

          Kongō is believed to have sunk in 350 feet (110 m) of water approximately 55 nautical miles (102 km 63 mi) northwest of Keelung. She was one of only three British-built battleships sunk by submarine attack during World War II. The other two were the British Revenge-class battleship HMS Royal Oak and the Queen Elizabeth-class battleship HMS Barham.

          Urakaze (浦風, "Wind on the Sea") was one of 19 Kagerō-class destroyers built for the Imperial Japanese Navy during the 1930s.

          On 21 November 1944, Urakaze was torpedoed and sunk with all hands - including Commander Destroyer Division 17 (Captain Tamotsu Tanii) - by the submarine USS Sealion, 65 miles (105 km) north-northwest of Keelung, Formosa(26°09′N 121°23′E). The torpedo that sank her was one out of three launched by the submarine that sank her and the battleship Kongō.


          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          Other Events on 21 November

          1620 – Plymouth Colony settlers sign the Mayflower Compact (November 11, O.S.)

          1673 – Launch of French Indien, (ex-Anonyme) 40–44 guns, design by Laurent Coulomb at Toulon – deleted as frigate 1691, but probably used as a flûte and renamed Concorde in April 1692.

          1680 – Launch of French Ardent, 64 guns (designed and built by Étienne Salicon, at Le Havre – Captured by the Dutch in the Battle of Marbella in March 1705

          1720 - HMS Speedwell (1690 - 28), Cptn. Hon. George Clinton, wrecked on the Dutch coast.

          HMS Speedwell (1690) was an 8-gun fireship, rebuilt in 1702 as a 28-gun fifth rate, and wrecked in 1720.

          1739 - British squadron of 6 ships of the line, under Vice Admiral Edward Vernon, bombard and capture of Porto Bello, Panama.

          1861 - During the Civil War, the screw steamer USS New London, along with screw steamer R.R. Cuyler and crew members of the screw steamer Massachusetts, capture the Confederate schooner Olive with a cargo of lumber in Mississippi Sound.

          USS New London (1859) was a screw steamer of the Union Navy during the American Civil War. She was outfitted with a Parrott rifle and 32-pounders, and was assigned as a gunboat in the Union blockade of the Confederate States of America

          USS R. R. Cuyler was a steamer in the United States Navy during the American Civil War. She was outfitted by the Union Navy as a gunboat and was assigned to the Union blockade of the Confederate States of America.
          She was named for the president of the Central Georgia Railroad.

          1912 - Battle of Kaliakra

          The Battle of Kaliakra, usually known as the Attack of the Drazki (Bulgarian: Атаката на Дръзки) in Bulgaria, was a maritime action between four Bulgarian torpedo boats and the Ottoman cruiser Hamidiye in the Black Sea. It took place on 21 November 1912 at 32 miles off Bulgaria's primary port of Varna.

          During the course of the First Balkan War, the Ottoman Empire's supplies were dangerously limited after the battles in Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas and the sea route from the Romanian port Constanţa to Istanbul became vital for the Ottomans. The Ottoman navy also imposed a blockade on the Bulgarian coast and on 15 October, the commander of the cruiser Hamidiye threatened to destroy Varna and Balchik, unless the two towns surrendered.

          On 21 November an Ottoman convoy was attacked by the four Bulgarian torpedo boats Drazki (Bold), Letyashti (Flying), Smeli (Brave) and Strogi (Strict). The attack was led by Letyashti, whose torpedoes missed, as did those of Smeli and Strogi, Smelibeing damaged by a 150 mm round with one of her crewmen wounded. Drazki however got within 100 meters from the Ottoman cruiser and her torpedoes struck the cruiser's starboard side, causing a 10 square meter hole.

          However, Hamidiye was not sunk, due to her well-trained crew, strong forward bulkheads, the functionality of all her water pumps and a very calm sea. She did however have 8 crewmen killed and 30 wounded, and was repaired within months.

          After this encounter, the Ottoman blockade of the Bulgarian coast was significantly loosened.

          1918 - U.S. battleships witness the surrender of German High Seas fleet at Rosyth, Firth of Forth, Scotland to U.S. and British fleets.

          1942 - USS Cincinnati (CL 6) and USS Somers (DD 381) uncover the Norwegian ship SS Skjilbred as being the German blockade runner Anneliese Essberger after setting explosions and boarding the ship. Survivors are taken on board USS Milwaukee (CL 5).

          USS Cincinnati (CL-6), was the third Omaha-class light cruiser, originally classified as a scout cruiser, built for the United States Navy. She was the third Navy ship named after the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, the first being Cincinnati, an ironcladcommissioned in 1862, during the Civil War, and the second being Cincinnati, a protected cruiser, that was decommissioned in 1919.
          Cincinnati split her pre-war career between the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets. She served in the Scouting Fleet, based in the Atlantic, in 1924 to 1927, serving in the Pacific for a brief time in 1925 for fleet maneuvers. Cincinnati joined the Asiatic Fleet in 1927, and returned to the Atlantic from 1928 to 1932. She continued to go back and forth between oceans until March 1941, when she was assigned to Neutrality Patrol in the western Atlantic.
          When the United States entered World War II she was assigned to TF41, based at Recife, and used on convoy escort duties and patrols in the south Atlantic. In 1944, she sailed for the Mediterranean to support Operation Dragoon, the invasion of the south of France. After the war, she was deemed surplus and scrapped at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in February 1946.

          The U.S. Navy light cruiser USS Cincinnati (CL-6) in New York Harbor (USA), on 22 March 1944. Photograph from the Bureau of Ships Collection in the U.S. National Archives.

          On 21 November 1942, along with her sister Milwaukee and the destroyer Somers, they spotted Anneliese Essberger. The crew had begun to scuttle the ship, but the boarding party that had been dispatched was able to reach the ship and discover her true identity, a German blockade runner, and take the crew of 62 as prisoners, before she sank.


          Today in Naval History - Naval / Maritime Events in History
          22 November 1718 – Off the coast of North Carolina, British pirate Edward Teach (best known as "Blackbeard") is killed in battle with a boarding party led by Royal Navy Lieutenant Robert Maynard.
          - Death of Edward Teach - better known as Blackbeard

          Edward Teach or Edward Thatch (c. 1680 – 22 November 1718), better known as Blackbeard, was an English pirate who operated around the West Indies and the eastern coast of Britain's North American colonies. Little is known about his early life, but he may have been a sailor on privateer ships during Queen Anne's War before settling on the Bahamian island of New Providence, a base for Captain Benjamin Hornigold, whose crew Teach joined around 1716. Hornigold placed him in command of a sloop that he had captured, and the two engaged in numerous acts of piracy. Their numbers were boosted by the addition to their fleet of two more ships, one of which was commanded by Stede Bonnet but Hornigold retired from piracy towards the end of 1717, taking two vessels with him.

          Teach captured a French merchant vessel, renamed her Queen Anne's Revenge, and equipped her with 40 guns. He became a renowned pirate, his nickname derived from his thick black beard and fearsome appearance he was reported to have tied lit fuses (slow matches) under his hat to frighten his enemies. He formed an alliance of pirates and blockaded the port of Charles Town, South Carolina, ransoming the port's inhabitants. He then ran Queen Anne's Revenge aground on a sandbar near Beaufort, North Carolina. He parted company with Bonnet and settled in Bath, North Carolina, also known as Bath Town where he accepted a royal pardon. But he was soon back at sea, where he attracted the attention of Alexander Spotswood, the Governor of Virginia. Spotswood arranged for a party of soldiers and sailors to capture the pirate, which they did on 22 November 1718 following a ferocious battle. Teach and several of his crew were killed by a small force of sailors led by Lieutenant Robert Maynard.

          Teach was a shrewd and calculating leader who spurned the use of force, relying instead on his fearsome image to elicit the response that he desired from those whom he robbed. Contrary to the modern-day picture of the traditional tyrannical pirate, he commanded his vessels with the consent of their crews and there is no known account of his ever having harmed or murdered those whom he held captive. He was romanticized after his death and became the inspiration for an archetypal pirate in works of fiction across many genres.

          Alexander Spotswood
          As it spread throughout the neighbouring colonies, the news of Teach and Vane's impromptu party worried the Governor of Pennsylvania enough to send out two sloops to capture the pirates. They were unsuccessful, but Governor of Virginia Alexander Spotswood was also concerned that the supposedly retired freebooter and his crew were living in nearby North Carolina. Some of Teach's former crew had already moved into several Virginian seaport towns, prompting Spotswood to issue a proclamation on 10 July, requiring all former pirates to make themselves known to the authorities, to give up their arms and to not travel in groups larger than three. As head of a Crown colony, Spotswood viewed the proprietary colony of North Carolina with contempt he had little faith in the ability of the Carolinians to control the pirates, who he suspected would be back to their old ways, disrupting Virginian commerce, as soon as their money ran out.[60]

          Blackbeard the Pirate: this was published in the General History of the Pyrates, 1725.

          Spotswood learnt that William Howard, the former quartermaster of Queen Anne's Revenge, was in the area, and believing that he might know of Teach's whereabouts had the pirate and his two slaves arrested. Spotswood had no legal authority to have pirates tried, and as a result, Howard's attorney, John Holloway, brought charges against Captain Brand of HMS Lyme, where Howard was imprisoned. He also sued on Howard's behalf for damages of £500, claiming wrongful arrest.

          Spotswood's council claimed that Teach's presence was a crisis and that under a statute of William III, the governor was entitled to try Howard without a jury. The charges referred to several acts of piracy supposedly committed after the pardon's cut-off date, in "a sloop belonging to ye subjects of the King of Spain", but ignored the fact that they took place outside Spotswood's jurisdiction and in a vessel then legally owned. Another charge cited two attacks, one of which was the capture of a slave ship off Charles Town Bar, from which one of Howard's slaves was presumed to have come. Howard was sent to await trial before a Court of Vice-Admiralty, on the charge of piracy, but Brand and his colleague, Captain Gordon (of HMS Pearl) refused to serve with Holloway present. Incensed, Holloway had no option but to stand down, and was replaced by the Attorney General of Virginia, John Clayton, whom Spotswood described as "an honester man [than Holloway]". Howard was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged, but was saved by a commission from London, which directed Spotswood to pardon all acts of piracy committed by surrendering pirates before 23 July 1718.

          Spotswood had obtained from Howard valuable information on Teach's whereabouts, and he planned to send his forces across the border into North Carolina to capture him. He gained the support of two men keen to discredit North Carolina's Governor—Edward Moseley and Colonel Maurice Moore. He also wrote to the Lords of Trade, suggesting that the Crown might benefit financially from Teach's capture. Spotswood personally financed the operation, possibly believing that Teach had fabulous treasures hidden away. He ordered Captains Gordon and Brand of HMS Pearl and HMS Lyme to travel overland to Bath. Lieutenant Robert Maynard of HMS Pearl was given command of two commandeered sloops, to approach the town from the sea. An extra incentive for Teach's capture was the offer of a reward from the Assembly of Virginia, over and above any that might be received from the Crown.

          Maynard took command of the two armed sloops on 17 November. He was given 57 men—33 from HMS Pearl and 24 from HMS Lyme. Maynard and the detachment from HMS Pearl took the larger of the two vessels and named her Jane the rest took Ranger, commanded by one of Maynard's officers, a Mister Hyde. Some from the two ships' civilian crews remained aboard. They sailed from Kecoughtan, along the James River, on 17 November. The two sloops moved slowly, giving Brand's force time to reach Bath. Brand set out for North Carolina six days later, arriving within three miles of Bath on 23 November. Included in Brand's force were several North Carolinians, including Colonel Moore and Captain Jeremiah Vail, sent to put down any local objection to the presence of foreign soldiers. Moore went into the town to see if Teach was there, reporting back that he was not, but that the pirate was expected at "every minute." Brand then went to Governor Eden's home and informed him of his purpose. The next day, Brand sent two canoes down Pamlico River to Ocracoke Inlet, to see if Teach could be seen. They returned two days later and reported on what eventually transpired.

          Last battle
          Maynard found the pirates anchored on the inner side of Ocracoke Island, on the evening of 21 November. He had ascertained their position from ships he had stopped along his journey, but unfamiliar with the local channels and shoals he decided to wait until the following morning to make his attack. He stopped all traffic from entering the inlet—preventing any warning of his presence—and posted a lookout on both sloops to ensure that Teach could not escape to sea.[72] On the other side of the island, Teach was busy entertaining guests and had not set a lookout. With Israel Hands ashore in Bath with about 24 of Adventure's sailors, he also had a much-reduced crew. Johnson (1724) reported that the pirate had "no more than twenty-five men on board" and that he "gave out to all the vessels that he spoke with that he had forty". "Thirteen white and six Negroes", was the number later reported by Brand to the Admiralty.

          At daybreak, preceded by a small boat taking soundings, Maynard's two sloops entered the channel. The small craft was quickly spotted by Adventure and fired at as soon as it was within range of her guns. While the boat made a quick retreat to the Jane, Teach cut the Adventure's anchor cable. His crew hoisted the sails and the Adventure manoeuvred to point her starboard guns toward Maynard's sloops, which were slowly closing the gap. Hyde moved Ranger to the port side of Jane and the Union flag was unfurled on each ship. Adventure then turned toward the beach of Ocracoke Island, heading for a narrow channel. What happened next is uncertain. Johnson claimed that there was an exchange of small-arms fire following which Adventure ran aground on a sandbar, and Maynard anchored and then lightened his ship to pass over the obstacle. Another version claimed that Jane and Ranger ran aground, although Maynard made no mention of this in his log.

          What is certain though is that Adventure turned her guns on the two ships and fired. The broadside was devastating in an instant, Maynard had lost as much as a third of his forces. About 20 on Janewere either wounded or killed and 9 on Ranger. Hyde was dead and his second and third officers either dead or seriously injured. His sloop was so badly damaged that it played no further role in the attack.[80] Again, contemporary accounts of what happened next are confused, but small-arms fire from Jane may have cut Adventure's jib sheet, causing her to lose control and run onto the sandbar. In the aftermath of Teach's overwhelming attack, Jane and Ranger may also have been grounded the battle would have become a race to see who could float their ship first.

          Capture of the Pirate, Blackbeard, 1718, Jean Leon Gerome Ferris, painted in 1920

          The lieutenant had kept many of his men below deck and in anticipation of being boarded told them to prepare for close fighting. Teach watched as the gap between the vessels closed, and ordered his men to be ready. The two vessels contacted one another as the Adventure's grappling hooks hit their target and several grenades, made from powder and shot-filled bottles and ignited by fuses, broke across the sloop's deck. As the smoke cleared, Teach led his men aboard, buoyant at the sight of Maynard's apparently empty ship, his men firing at the small group formed by the lieutenant and his men at the stern.

          The rest of Maynard's men then burst from the hold, shouting and firing. The plan to surprise Teach and his crew worked the pirates were apparently taken aback at the assault. Teach rallied his men and the two groups fought across the deck, which was already slick with blood from those killed or injured by Teach's broadside. Maynard and Teach fired their flintlocks at each other, then threw them away. Teach drew his cutlass and managed to break Maynard's sword. Against superior training and a slight advantage in numbers, the pirates were pushed back toward the bow, allowing the Jane's crew to surround Maynard and Teach, who was by then completely isolated. As Maynard drew back to fire once again, Teach moved in to attack him, but was slashed across the neck by one of Maynard's men. Badly wounded, he was then attacked and killed by several more of Maynard's crew. The remaining pirates quickly surrendered. Those left on the Adventure were captured by the Ranger's crew, including one who planned to set fire to the powder room and blow up the ship. Varying accounts exist of the battle's list of casualties Maynard reported that 8 of his men and 12 pirates were killed. Brand reported that 10 pirates and 11 of Maynard's men were killed. Spotswood claimed ten pirates and ten of the King's men dead.

          Edward Teach's severed head hangs from Maynard's bowsprit, as pictured in Charles Elles's The Pirates Own Book (1837)

          Maynard later examined Teach's body, noting that it had been shot five times and cut about twenty. He also found several items of correspondence, including a letter to the pirate from Tobias Knight. Teach's corpse was thrown into the inlet and his head was suspended from the bowsprit of Maynard's sloop so that the reward could be collected

          HMS Pearl was a 42-gun fourth-rate of the Royal Navy. Her crew was involved in the hunt and death of Blackbeard in 1718.

          • 117 ft (35.7 m) (gundeck)
          • 96 ft 9.5 in (29.5 m) (keel)
          • Lower gundeck: 18 × 9-pounder guns
          • Upper gundeck: 20 × 6-pounder guns
          • Quarterdeck: 4 × 6-pounder guns

          Anti-piracy operations
          By 1718 the Pearl was stationed in Virginia, under Captain Gordon, and with Robert Maynard as her first lieutenant. That year, Governor Alexander Spotswood issued an order for the capture of the pirate Blackbeard. Blackbeard, who had supposedly retired, was living in the neighbouring Province of North Carolina, and Spotswood felt that he was an immediate threat to Virginia commerce should he resume his pirating career. Using information gathered from a captured member of Blackbeard's crew, Spotswood dispatched 33 crewmen from the Pearl and 24 crewmen from HMS Lyme and commandeered two merchant sloops, which they used to sail down the coast to North Carolina. With Maynard in command, the group finally located Blackbeard's ship, the Adventure, and attacked, resulting in his subsequent death and post-mortem decapitation by Maynard.

          The Pearl remained in American waters until 1719, returning to Britain to be paid off in December 1719. She was broken up at Deptford Dockyard between December 1722 and January 1723. The succeeding HMS Pearl, launched in 1726, was ordered as a rebuild of the 42-gun ship

          INTRODUCTION By Major-General D. E. Sickles, U.S.A.

          I am glad to write an introduction to a memoir ofLieutenant-General Longstreet.

          If it be thought strange that I should write a prefaceto a memoir of a conspicuous adversary, I reply thatthe Civil War is only a memory, its asperities are forgotten,both armies were American, old army friendshipshave been renewed and new army friendships havebeen formed among the combatants, the truth of historyis dear to all of us, and the amenities of chivalrous manhoodare cherished alike by the North and the South,when justice to either is involved. Longstreet’s splendidrecord as a soldier needs neither apologies nor eulogium.And if I venture, further along in this introduction, todefend him from unfair criticism, it is because my personalknowledge of the battle of July 2, 1863, qualifiesme to testify in his behalf. It was the fortune of mycorps to meet Longstreet on many great fields. It isnow my privilege to offer a tribute to his memory. AsColonel Damas says in “The Lady of Lyons,” afterhis duel with Melnotte, “It’s astonishing how much Ilike a man after I’ve fought with him.”

          Often adversaries on the field of battle, we becamegood friends after peace was restored. He supportedPresident Grant and his successors in their wise policyof restoration. Longstreet’s example was the rainbowof reconciliation that foreshadowed real peace betweenthe North and South. He drew the fire of the irreconcilableSouth. His statesmanlike forecast blazed the 18 path of progress and prosperity for his people, impoverishedby war and discouraged by adversity. Hewas the first of the illustrious Southern war leaders toaccept the result of the great conflict as final. Hefolded up forever the Confederate flag he had followedwith supreme devotion, and thenceforth saluted theStars and Stripes of the Union with unfalteringhomage. He was the trusted servant of the republic inpeace, as he had been its relentless foe in war. Thefriends of the Union became his friends, the enemies ofthe Union his enemies.

          I trust I may be pardoned for relating an incidentthat reveals the sunny side of Longstreet’s genial nature.When I visited Georgia, in March, 1892, I wastouched by a call from the General, who came fromGainesville to Atlanta to welcome me to his State. OnSt. Patrick’s Day we supped together as guests of theIrish Societies of Atlanta, at their banquet. We enteredthe hall arm in arm, about nine o’clock in the evening,and were received by some three hundred gentlemen,with the wildest and loudest “rebel yell” I hadever heard. When I rose to respond to a toast in honorof the Empire State of the North, Longstreet stoodalso and leaned with one arm on my shoulder, the betterto hear what I had to say, and this was a signal foranother outburst. I concluded my remarks by proposing,​&mdash​

          “Health and long life to my old adversary, Lieutenant-GeneralLongstreet,”

          assuring the audience that, although the General did notoften make speeches, he would sing the “Star-SpangledBanner.” This was, indeed, a risky promise, as I hadnever heard the General sing. I was greatly relievedby his exclamation:

          And he did sing the song admirably, the companyjoining with much enthusiasm.

          As the hour was late, and we had enjoyed quite anumber of potations of hot Irish whiskey punch, wedecided to go to our lodgings long before the end ofthe revel, which appeared likely to last until daybreak.When we descended to the street we were unable tofind a carriage, but Longstreet proposed to be myguide and, although the streets were dark and the walka long one, we reached my hotel in fairly good form.Not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, I said,​&mdash​

          “Longstreet, the streets of Atlanta are very darkand it is very late, and you are somewhat deaf andrather infirm now I must escort you to your head-quarters.”

          “All right,” said Longstreet “come on and we’llhave another handshake over the bloody chasm.”

          When we arrived at his stopping-place and wereabout to separate, as I supposed, he turned to me and said,​&mdash​

          “Sickles, the streets of Atlanta are very dark andyou are lame, and a stranger here, and do not knowthe way back to your hotel I must escort you home.”

          “Come along, Longstreet,” was my answer.

          On our way to the hotel, I said to him,​&mdash​

          “Old fellow, I hope you are sorry for shooting offmy leg at Gettysburg. I suppose I will have to forgiveyou for it some day.”

          “Forgive me?” Longstreet exclaimed. “You oughtto thank me for leaving you one leg to stand on, afterthe mean way you behaved to me at Gettysburg.”

          How often we performed escort duty for each otheron that eventful night I have never been able to recallwith precision but I am quite sure that I shall neverforget St. Patrick’s Day in 1892, at Atlanta, Georgia, 20 when Longstreet and I enjoyed the good Irish whiskeypunch at the banquet of the Knights of St. Patrick.

          Afterwards Longstreet and I met again, at Gettysburg,this time as the guests of John Russell Young,who had invited a number of his literary and journalisticfriends to join us on the old battle-field. Werode in the same carriage. When I assisted the Generalin climbing up the rocky face of Round Top, he turnedto me and said,​&mdash​

          “Sickles, you can well afford to help me up herenow, for if you had not kept me away so long fromRound Top on the 2d of July, 1863, the war wouldhave lasted longer than it did, and might have had adifferent ending.”

          As he said this, his stern, leonine face softened with asmile as sweet as a brother’s.

          We met in March, 1901, at the reception given toPresident McKinley on his second inauguration. Inthe midst of the great throng assembled on that occasionLongstreet and I had quite a reception of our own.He was accompanied on this occasion by Mrs. Longstreet.Every one admired the blended courtliness andgallantry of the veteran hero towards the ladies whowere presented to him and his charming wife.

          At the West Point Centennial Longstreet and I sattogether on the dais, near President Roosevelt, the Secretaryof War, Mr. Root, and the commander of thearmy, Lieutenant-General Miles. Here among hisfellow-graduates of the Military Academy, he receiveda great ovation from the vast audience that filled CullumHall. Again and again he was cheered, when heturned to me, exclaiming,​&mdash​

          “Sickles, what are they all cheering about?”

          “They are cheering you, General,” was my reply.

          Joy lighted up his countenance, the war was forgotten,and Longstreet was at home once more at WestPoint.

          21 Again we stood upon the same platform, in Washington,on May 30,​&mdash​Memorial Day,​&mdash�. Togetherwe reviewed, with President Roosevelt, the magnificentcolumn of Union veterans that marched past the President’sreviewing-stand. That evening Longstreetjoined me in a visit to a thousand or more soldiers ofthe Third Army Corps, assembled in a tent near theWhite House. These veterans, with a multitude oftheir comrades, had come to Washington to commemorateanother Memorial Day in the Capitol of theNation. The welcome given him by this crowd of oldsoldiers, who had fought him with all their might againand again, on many battle-fields, could hardly have beenmore cordial if he had found himself in the midst of anequal number of his own command. His speech to themen was felicitous, and enthusiastically cheered. In aneloquent peroration he said, “I hope to live long enoughto see my surviving comrades march side by side withthe Union veterans along Pennsylvania Avenue, andthen I will die happy.” This was the last time I metLongstreet.

          Longstreet was unjustly blamed for not attackingearlier in the day, on July 2, 1863, at Gettysburg. Ican answer that criticism, as I know more about thematter than the critics. If he had attacked in the morning,as it is said he should have done, he would haveencountered Buford’s division of cavalry, five thousandsabres, on his flank, and my corps would have been inhis front, as it was in the afternoon. In a word, all thetroops that opposed Longstreet in the afternoon, includingthe Fifth Army Corps and Caldwell’s divisionof the Second Corps, would have been available on theleft flank of the Union army in the morning. Everyregiment and every battery that fired a shot in theafternoon was on the field in the morning, and wouldhave resisted an assault in the morning as stubbornly 22 as in the afternoon. Moreover, if the assault had beenmade in the morning, Law’s strong brigade of Alabamianscould not have assisted in the attack, as theydid not arrive on the field until noon. On the otherhand, if Lee had waited an hour later, I would havebeen on Cemetery Ridge, in compliance with GeneralMeade’s orders, and Longstreet could have marched,unresisted, from Seminary Ridge to the foot of RoundTop, and might, perhaps, have unlimbered his guns onthe summit.

          General Meade’s telegram to Halleck, dated 3 P.M. ,July 2, does not indicate that Lee was then about toattack him. At the time that despatch was sent, acouncil of corps commanders was assembled at GeneralMeade’s head-quarters. It was broken up by the soundof Longstreet’s artillery. The probability is that Longstreet’sattack held the Union army at Gettysburg. IfLongstreet had waited until a later hour, the Unionarmy might have been moving towards Pipe Creek, theposition chosen by General Meade on June 30.

          The best proof that Lee was not dissatisfied withLongstreet’s movements on July 2 is the fact thatLongstreet was intrusted with the command of thecolumn of attack on July 3,​&mdash​Lee’s last hope at Gettysburg.Of the eleven brigades that assaulted the Unionleft centre on July 3, only three of them​&mdash​Pickett’s division​&mdash​belongedto Longstreet’s corps, the other eightbrigades belonged to Hill’s corps. If Longstreet haddisappointed Lee on July 2, why would Lee, on thenext day, give Longstreet a command of supreme importance,of which more than two-thirds of the troopswere taken from another corps commander?

          Longstreet did not look for success on July 3. Hetold General Lee that “the fifteen thousand men whocould make a successful assault over that field had neverbeen arrayed for battle,” and yet the command was 23 given to Longstreet. Why? Because the confidenceof Lee in Longstreet was unshaken because he regardedLongstreet as his most capable lieutenant.

          Longstreet was never censured for the failure of theassault on July 3, although General Lee intimates, inhis official report, that it was not made as early in theday as was expected. Why, then, is Longstreet blamedby them for the failure on July 2, when no fault wasfound by General Lee with Longstreet’s dispositionson that day? The failure of both assaults must be attributedto insurmountable obstacles, which no commandercould have overcome with the force at Longstreet’sdisposal,​&mdash​seventeen thousand men on July 2,and fifteen thousand men on July 3, against thirtythousand adversaries!

          In General Lee’s official report not a word appearsabout any delay in Longstreet’s movements on July 2,although, referring to the assault of July 3, GeneralLee says, “General Longstreet’s dispositions were notcompleted as early as was expected.” If General Leedid not hesitate to point out unlooked for delay onJuly 3, why was he silent about delay on July 2? Hissilence about delay on July 2 implies that there wasnone on July 2. Expresio unius exclusio alterius.

          General Lee says, in his report, referring to July 3,​&mdash​

          “General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying thehigh, rocky hills on the enemy’s extreme left, from which histroops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. Hisoperations had been embarrassed the day previous by the samecause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank andrear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws.”

          Another embarrassment prevented an earlier attackon July 2. It was the plan of General Lee to surprisethe left flank of the Union army. General Lee orderedCaptain Johnson, the engineer officer of his staff, to 24 conduct Longstreet’s column by a route concealed fromthe enemy. But the formation and movements of theattacking column had been discovered by my reconnoisancethis exposure put an end to any chance ofsurprise. Other dispositions became necessary freshorders from head-quarters were asked for another lineof advance had to be found, less exposed to view. Allthis took time. These circumstances were, of course,known to General Lee hence he saw no reason toreproach Longstreet for delay.

          The situation on the left flank of the Union army wasentirely changed by my advance to the Emmitsburgroad. Fitzhugh Lee says, “Lee was deceived by it andgave orders to attack up the Emmitsburg road, partiallyenveloping the enemy’s left there was muchbehind Sickles.” The obvious purpose of my advancewas to hold Lee’s force in check until General Meadecould bring his reserves from his right flank, at RockCreek, to the Round Tops, on the left. Fortunatelyfor me, General Lee believed that my line from thePeach-Orchard north​&mdash​about a division front​&mdash​was allLongstreet would have to deal with. Longstreet soondiscovered that my left rested beyond Devil’s Den, abouttwelve hundred yards easterly from the Emmitsburgroad, and at a right angle to it. Of course, Longstreetcould not push forward to Lee’s objective,​&mdash​the Emmitsburgroad ridge,​&mdash​leaving this force on his flankand rear, to take him in reverse. An obstinate conflictfollowed, which detained Longstreet until the FifthCorps, which had been in reserve on the Union right,moved to the left and got into position on the RoundTops. Thus it happened that my salient at the Peach-Orchard,on the Emmitsburg road, was not attackeduntil six o’clock, the troops on my line, from the Emmitsburgroad to the Devil’s Den, having held theirpositions until that hour. The surprise Lee had planned 25 was turned upon himself. The same thing would havehappened if Longstreet had attacked in the morningall the troops that resisted Longstreet in the afternoon​&mdash​saythirty thousand​&mdash​would have opposed him in theforenoon.

          The alignment of the Union forces on the left flankat 11 A.M. , when Lee gave his preliminary orders toLongstreet for the attack, was altogether differentfrom the dispositions made by me at 3 P.M. , when theattack was begun. At eleven in the morning my commandwas on Cemetery Ridge, to the left of Hancock.At two o’clock in the afternoon, anticipating GeneralLee’s attack, I changed front, deploying my left division(Birney’s) from Plum Run, near the base ofLittle Round Top, to the Peach-Orchard, at the intersectionof Millerstown and Emmitsburg roads. Myright division (Humphrey’s) was moved forward to theEmmitsburg road, its left connecting with Birney atthe Orchard, and its right en echelon with Hancock,parallel with the Codori House.

          Longstreet was ordered to conceal his column of attack,for which the ground on Lee’s right afforded excellentopportunities. Lee’s plan was a repetition ofJackson’s attack on the right flank of the Union armyat Chancellorsville. In the afternoon, however, in viewof the advance of my corps, General Lee was obligedto form a new plan of battle. As he believed that bothof my flanks rested on the Emmitsburg road, Lee directedLongstreet to envelop my left at the Peach-Orchard,and press the attack northward “up theEmmitsburg road.”

          Colonel Fairfax, of Longstreet’s staff, says that Leeand Longstreet were together at three o’clock, whenthe attack began. Lieutenant-General Hill, commandingthe First Corps of Lee’s army, says in his report,​&mdash​

          “The corps of General Longstreet (McLaws’s and Hood’sdivisions) was on my right, and in a line very nearly at rightangles to mine. General Longstreet was to attack the left flankof the enemy, and sweep down his line, and I was ordered toco-operate with him with such of my brigades from the rightas could join in with his troops in the attack. On the extremeright, Hood commenced the attack about two o’clock, McLawsabout 5.30 o’clock.”

          Longstreet was not long in discovering, by his artillerypractice, that my position at the Peach-Orchardwas a salient, and that my left flank really rested twelvehundred yards eastward, at Plum Run, in the valleybetween Little Round Top and the Devil’s Den, concealedfrom observation by woods my line extended tothe high ground along the Emmitsburg road, fromwhich Lee says, “It was thought our artillery could beused to advantage in assailing the more elevated groundbeyond.”

          General J. B. Hood’s story of his part in the battleof July 2, taken from a communication addressed toGeneral Longstreet, which appears in Hood’s “Advanceand Retreat,” pages 57&ndash59, is a clear narrativeof the movements of Longstreet’s assaulting column.It emphasizes the firm adherence of Longstreet to theorders of General Lee. Again and again, as Hoodplainly points out, Longstreet refused to listen toHood’s appeal for leave to turn Round Top and assailthe Union rear, always replying, “General Lee’s ordersare to attack up the Emmitsburg road.”A

          These often repeated orders of General Lee to“attack up the Emmitsburg road” could not have been 28 given until near three in the afternoon of July 2, becausebefore that hour there was no Union line ofbattle on the Emmitsburg road. There had been onlya few of my pickets there in the morning, thrown forwardby the First Massachusetts Infantry. It distinctlyappears that Lee rejected Longstreet’s plan toturn the Federal left on Cemetery Ridge. And Hoodmakes it plain enough that Longstreet refused to listento Hood’s appeal for permission to turn Round Top,on the main Federal line, always replying, “No GeneralLee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburgroad.” Of course, that plan of battle was not formeduntil troops had been placed in positions commandingthat road. This, we have seen, was not done untiltowards three in the afternoon.

          The only order of battle announced by General Leeon July 2 of which there is any record was to assailmy position on the Emmitsburg road, turn my leftflank (which he erroneously supposed to rest on thePeach-Orchard), and sweep the attack “up the Emmitsburgroad.” This was impossible until I occupiedthat road, and it was then that Longstreet’s artillerybegan its practice on my advanced line.

          I am unable to see how any just person can chargeLongstreet with deviation from the orders of GeneralLee on July 2. It is true enough that Longstreet hadadvised different tactics but he was a soldier,​&mdash​a WestPointer,​&mdash​and once he had indicated his own views, he 29 obeyed the orders of the general commanding,​&mdash​he didnot even exercise the discretion allowed to the chief ofa corps d’armée, which permits him to modify instructionswhen an unforeseen emergency imposes freshresponsibilities, or when an unlooked-for opportunityoffers tempting advantages.

          We have seen that many circumstances requiredGeneral Lee to modify his plans and orders on July 2between daybreak, when his first reconnoisance wasmade, and three o’clock in the afternoon, when myadvanced position was defined. We have seen that ifa morning attack had been made the column wouldhave encountered Buford’s strong division of cavalryon its flank, and that it would have been weakened bythe absence of Law’s brigade of Hood’s division. Wehave seen that Longstreet, even in the afternoon, whenLaw had come up and Buford had been sent to Westminster,was still too weak to contend against the reinforcementssent against him. We have seen thatLee was present all day on July 2, and that his ownstaff-officer led the column of attack. We have seenthat General Lee, in his official report, gives no hintof dissatisfaction with Longstreet’s conduct of the battleof July 2, nor does it appear that Longstreet wasever afterwards criticised by Lee. On the contrary,Lee points out that the same danger to Longstreet’sflank, which required the protection of two divisionson July 3, existed on July 2, when his flank wasunsupported. We have seen that again and again,when Hood appealed to Longstreet for leave to swinghis column to the right and turn the Round Tops,Longstreet as often refused, always saying, “NoGeneral Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburgroad.” The conclusion is irrefutable, that whilst theoperations were directed with signal ability and sustainedby heroic courage, the failure of both assaults, 30 that of July 2 and the other of July 3, must be attributedto the lack of strength in the columns of attackon both days, for which the commanding general alonewas responsible.

          It was Longstreet’s good fortune to live until he sawhis country hold a high place among the great powersof the world. He saw the new South advancing inprosperity, hand in hand with the North, East, andWest. He saw his people in the ranks of our army, inCuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, China, and Panamahe saw the Union stars and the blue uniform worn byFitzhugh Lee, and Butler, and Wheeler. He witnessedthe fulfilment of his prediction,​&mdash​that the hearty reunionof the North and South would advance the welfareof both. He lived long enough to rejoice with allof us in a reunited nation, and to know that his namewas honored wherever the old flag was unfurled. Hisfame as a soldier belongs to all Americans.

          Farewell, Longstreet! I shall follow you very soon.May we meet in the happy realm where strife is unknownand friendship is eternal!

          Referanser [ rediger | rediger kilde ]

          1. ^ Busey and Martin, s. 260. «Styrke som deltok» i slaget var 71𧎻. McPherson, s. 648, sier at styrken i begynnelsen av felttoget var 75 000.
          2. ^ Coddington, s. 8-9. Eicher, s. 490.
          3. ^ Eicher, s. 491.
          4. ^ Busey and Martin, s. 125. «Styrke som deltok» i slaget var 93𧒙.
          5. ^ Symonds, s. 36.
          6. ^ Trudeau, s. 45, 66.
          7. ^Lees ordrer fra Chambersburg, 27. juni 1863
          8. ^ Symonds, s. 49-54.
          9. ^ Nye, s. 272-78.
          10. ^ Symonds, s. 41-43. Sears, s. 103-06. Esposito, tekst til kart 94 (kart 34b i nettversjonen). Eicher, s. 504-07. McPherson, s. 649.
          11. ^ Sears, s. 123. Trudeau, s. 128.
          12. ^ Coddington, s. 181, 189.
          13. ^ Eicher, s. 508-09, forkaster Heths påstand siden det tidligere besøket til Early i Gettysburg ville ha gjort det åpenbart at der ikke var skofabrikker eller lagre i landsbyen. Men mange historikere i hovedstrømmen aksepterer Heths forklaring: Sears, s. 136 Foote, s. 465 Clark, s. 35 Tucker, s. 97-98 Martin, s. 25 Pfanz, First Day, s. 25.
          14. ^ Eicher, s. 508. Tucker, s. 99-102.
          15. ^ Sears, pp. 155-58.
          16. ^Battle of Gettysburg: «Who Really Fired the First Shot?»Arkivert 10. august 2006 hos Wayback Machine.
          17. ^Marcellus Jones Monument ved GettysburgArkivert 27. juni 2015 hos Wayback Machine.
          18. ^ Martin, s. 80-81. Styrkene bar karabiner med bakladere og enkeltskudd laget av Sharps, Burnside og andre. Det er en moderne myte at de var bevæpnet med flerskudds repeterende karabiner. Likevel var de i stand til å skyte to eller tre ganger raskere enn de munnladede karabinene eller riflene.
          19. ^ Symonds, p. 71. Coddington, p. 266. Eicher, pp. 510-11.
          20. ^ Tucker, pp. 112-17.
          21. ^ Coddington, s. 269. Andre kilder som Sears, s. 170, siterer Reynolds assistent, Charles Veil, at en «Minnie [sic] ball struck him in the back of the neck.»
          22. ^ Tucker, s. 184. Symonds, s. 74. Pfanz, First Day, s. 269-75.
          23. ^ Busey and Martin, s. 298, 501.
          24. ^ Pfanz, First Day, s. 275-93.
          25. ^ Clark, s. 53.
          26. ^ Pfanz, First Day, s. 158.
          27. ^ Pfanz, First Day, s. 230.
          28. ^ Pfanz, First Day, s. 156-238.
          29. ^ Pfanz, First Day, s. 294.
          30. ^ Pfanz, First Day, s. 337-38. Sears, s. 223-25.
          31. ^ Martin, s. 482-88.
          32. ^ Pfanz, First Day, s. 344. Eicher, s. 517. Sears, s. 228. Trudeau, s. 253. Både Sears og Trudeau nevner «dersom mulig».
          33. ^ Martin, s. 9, som siterer Thomas L. Livermore's Numbers & Losses in the Civil War in America (Houghton Mifflin, 1900).
          34. ^ Coddington, s. 333. Tucker, s. 327.
          35. ^ Clark, s. 74. Eicher, s. 521.
          36. ^ Sears, p. 255. Clark, p. 69.
          37. ^ Pfanz, Second Day, s. 93-97. Eicher, s. 523-24.
          38. ^ Pfanz, Second Day, s. 119-23.
          39. ^ Harman, s. 59.
          40. ^ Harman, s. 57.
          41. ^ Sears, s. 833-35. Eicher, s. 530-35. Coddington, s. 423.
          42. ^ Eicher, s. 527-30. Clark, s. 81-85.
          43. ^ Eicher, s. 537-38. Sauers, s. 835. Pfanz, Culp's Hill, s. 205-34. Clark, s. 115-16.
          44. ^ Pfanz, Culp's Hill, s. 235-83. Clark, s. 116-18. Eicher, s. 538-39.
          45. ^ Sears, s. 257. Longacre, s. 198-99.
          46. ^ Harman, p. 63.
          47. ^ Pfanz, Culp's Hill, s. 284-352. Eicher, s. 540-41. Coddington, s. 465-75.
          48. ^ Eicher, s. 542. Coddington, pp. 485-86.
          49. ^ Anslag over antallet kanoner som ble satt inn, varierer. Coddington, s. 493: "over 150" Eicher, s. 543: 159 Trudeau, s. 452: 164 Symonds, s. 215: "more than 160" Clark, s. 128, "about 170" Pfanz, s. 45: "170 (we cannot know the exact number)." Alle er enige om at rundt 80 kanoner som var tilgjengelig for Army of Northern Virginia ikke ble brukt under bombardementet.
          50. ^ McPherson, s. 661-63. Clark, s. 133-44. Symonds, s. 214-41. Eicher, s. 543-49.
          51. ^ Eicher, s. 549-50. Longacre, s. 226-31, 240-44. Sauers, s. 836. Wert, s. 272-80.
          52. ^ Eicher, s. 550. Coddington, s. 539-44. Clark, s. 146-47. Wert, s. 300.
          53. ^ Clark, pp. 147-57. Longacre, pp. 268-69.
          54. ^ Coddington, s. 564.
          55. ^ Coddington, s. 535-74.
          56. ^George Meade (1815-1872) - Abraham Lincoln's White House
          57. ^ McPherson, p. 664.
          58. ^ McPherson, s. 650, 664.
          59. ^ Oosterlinck and Weidenmier, Did Johnny Reb have a Fighting Chance? A Probabilistic Assessment from European Financial MarketsArkivert 26. mars 2009 hos Wayback Machine., Lund University School of Economics and Management.
          60. ^ Busey og Martin, s. 125.
          61. ^ Busey og Martin, s. 260.
          62. ^ Sears, s. 513.
          63. ^ Sears, s. 391.
          64. ^ Sears, s. 511.
          65. ^ White, s. 251. White henviser til Lincolns bruk av begrepet «nye frihetsfødsel» og skriver at «Den nye fødselen som sakte steg frem i Lincolns politikk betydde at den 19. november ved Gettysburg forsvarte han ikke lenger, som i sin innsettelsestale, en gammel Union, men proklamerte en ny Union. Den gamle Unionen inneholdt og forsøkte å begrense slaveri. Den nye Unionen ville fullføre løftet om frihet, det avgjørende steget inn i fremtiden som grunnleggerne ikke hadde klart å ta.»


          «La volontà di vendicare l'oltraggio inflitto alla bandiera degli Stati Uniti d'America con il bombardamento e la battaglia di Fort Sumter spingevano i cittadini alle armi. Dovunque si reclutavano volontari, si costituivano reggimenti, si preparavano uniformi, cartucce, armi, materiale sanitario, s'inviavano truppe verso i luoghi ove si pensava che il fronte di guerra sarebbe passato [1] »

          Il Teatro Orientale incluse le campagne generalmente rimaste più famose nella storia della guerra civile, se non per il loro significato strategico, quindi per la loro prossimità ai maggiori centri urbani, alle sedi dei principali giornali e alle due capitali delle parti avversarie.

          L'immaginazione sia degli Stati Uniti d'America nord-orientali che degli Stati Uniti meridionali rimase catturata dalle lotte epiche tra il Confederate States Army guidato da Lee e l'Armata del Potomac, diretto quest'ultimo da tutta una serie di comandanti decisamente meno abili.

          Lo scontro più sanguinoso dell'intera guerra avvenuto a Gettysburg nella Pennsylvania (durato per 3 intere giornate) e il giorno più sanguinoso (quello verificatosi ad Antietam) saranno entrambi combattuti in questo Teatro le capitali di Washington e Richmond verranno entrambe attaccate o assediate.

          È stato variamente sostenuto sia dai commentatori del momento che dai futuri storici che il Teatro Orientale fosse strategicamente più importante per portare alla definitiva sconfitta dell'entità secessionista e fu d'altra parte inconcepibile che le popolazioni civili di entrambe le parti potessero considerare il conflitto in via di risoluzione senza una chiara resa nell'ambito di questo Teatro [2] .

          La zona dei movimenti militari orientali fu delimitata dai Monti Appalachi ad Ovest e dalla costa Atlantica ad Est. Di gran lunga la maggior parte delle battaglie avvenne nell'ambito delle 100 miglia che separano Washington da Richmond questo territorio favorirà i difensori confederati in quanto una serie di fiumi scorre principalmente da Ovest in direzione Est, rendendoli così per lo più degli ostacoli piuttosto che vie d'accesso o linee di comunicazione per gli attaccanti unionisti:tali fiumi e i loro punti di attraversamento, quali il Bull Run, il Potomac, il Rapahannok, il Rapidan, lo York e il James saranno luogo di importanti battaglie. Le Blue Ridge Mountains dividevano la Virginia in due creando solo due vie di invasione principali: via la Valle dello Shenondoah o via la Virginia Orientale incastonata tra le montagne e l'Atlantico: questo permise ai sudisti di difendere le posizioni con un numero non troppo elevato di uomini. Le strade nel Sud erano poche, sterrate e fangose durante le piogge: ciò limitata la capacità di movimento degli unionisti al contrario le dure strade del Nord svantaggiavano i confederati, che calzavano stivali non idonei.

          Una tale situazione fu molto differente rispetto ai primi anni del Teatro Occidentale e poiché le armate federali dovettero fare affidamento esclusivamente sul primitivo sistema stradale dell'epoca per i suoi trasporti primari di uomini e mezzi ciò limiterà di molto la possibilità di proseguire o avviare le campagne invernali per entrambe le parti. Il decisivo vantaggio dell'Unione sarà rappresentato dal pieno controllo del mare e dei maggiori corsi fluviali, il che avrebbe consentito di rafforzare e rifornire il proprio esercito rimasto nei pressi delle rive costiere [3] .

          La classificazione delle campagne inerenti alla guerra svoltasi sia ad Occidente che ad Oriente è stabilita dal National Park Service (NPS) [4] ed è più particolareggiata di quella utilizzata in questo compendio alcune campagne minori sono state pertanto omesse, mentre altre vengono raggruppate entro categorie più ampie. Vengono inoltre descritte solamente alcune delle 160 battaglie ufficiali classificate all'interno di questo Teatro. I box inseriti nel margine destro mostrano le campagne associate a ciascuna sezione.

          Watch the video: American Civil War: Battle of First Manassas - The Early Dawn of War - All Parts (January 2022).